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I. INTRODUCTION
[Privileges] do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of
truth, but rather they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is
the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly
or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance
to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts
needed in the administration of justice.'
[T]he public.., has a right to every man's evidence.
2
Confidentiality is vitally important to mediation because it
facilitates disclosure. People will not disclose personal
needs, strategies, and information if they feel it might be
used against them.
3
Evidentiary privileges, 4 of all kinds, are mixed blessings. On
the one hand, privileges are created to protect "interests and
relationships" deemed "of sufficient social importance." 5  On the
other hand, they permit the exclusion, or "sacrifice," of potentially
relevant, reliable, and credible evidence, often the kind of evidence
that many would not call "incidental.",6 Eminent evidence scholars
including Jeremy Bentham,7 John Henry Wigmore,8 Charles Alan
1. Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence,
16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938).
2. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
3. Kent L. Brown Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications,
1991 J. DIsp. RESOL. 307, 310.
4. Evidentiary privileges are different from substantive privileges.
Substantive privileges partly or completely shield the holder from liability for
certain claims. McCormick, supra note 1, at 447. Evidentiary privileges,
however, only shield the holder from providing certain evidence. Id.
5. Id. at 448.
6. Id.
7. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EvIDENCE
(Etienne Dumont ed.) (microfiche reproduction 1987) (1825) (arguing that
privileges are unjustified obstructions to fact-finding).
8. See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2 (establishing the instrumental
rationale, which is the prevailing theory of privileges).
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Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,9 and Edward J. Imwinkelried' °
have explored the rationales for evidentiary privileges, but they have
done so largely by considering privileges as a unitary concept. In
this article, I suggest that the justifications for privileges may differ
depending on whether the privilege is designed to protect certain
information or to enhance specific relationships. Both the drafters
and interpreters of evidentiary privileges would benefit, in terms of
greater clarity, predictability, utility, and integrity, from recognizing
two different concepts of evidentiary privilege: informational
privilege and relational privilege. With these starting points, it is
possible to make better sense of the complexities that attend the law
of privilege.
Part II of this article identifies and argues for a theory of
privilege that distinguishes between relational and informational
interests. Part III of the article provides case study of the problems
with drafting and interpreting privileges without a sound
understanding of the interests involved-the recent and mysterious
"mediation privilege". Where parties are engaged in the various
forms of alternative dispute resolution known as mediation,"
legislators and other rule drafters have granted different levels of
protection for statements made by various persons during the
mediation process and for materials prepared in the course of
9. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5422 (1980) (Supp. 2000).
10. See generally 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:
EvIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 5 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002) (challenging
the instrumental and humanistic rationales and arguing for a normative
rationale).
11. The term mediation is problematic because there are different types of
interaction that can be called mediation. See Alan Kirtley, The Mediation
Privilege's Transition From Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the
Public Interest, 1995 J. DIsp. RESOL. 1, 5-10. There are many definitions for
mediation, but "[a]t its essence, mediation is a process of negotiations
facilitated by a third person(s) who assists disputants to pursue a mutually
agreeable settlement of their conflict." Id. at 5. Kirtley goes on to note that a
broad approach to the definition of mediation "yields uncertainty and the
potential for over-inclusiveness." Id. at 22; see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 1115
(Deering 2004) (providing a broad definition of mediation).
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mediation. 12 The rationale and scope of these provisions are far from
clear, however. I use the California Supreme Court's recent
interpretation of the mediation privilege in Rojas v. Superior Court'
3
to illustrate the difference between relational privileges and
informational privileges and the problems that ensue when the
concepts are confused. By mixing the concepts of relational
privilege and informational privilege, the drafters and interpreters of
the California mediation privilege have created unwarranted,
absolute barriers to the resolution of disputes in a manner that
inhibits rather than promotes "the administration of justice." 14
Behind the struggle to define and apply privileges there are
lessons to be learned about evidence rule making. In constructing
relational and informational privileges, there is a role for both
legislatures, which can dictate the values behind each privilege, and
courts, which interpret the legislature's abstract language in concrete
settings. There is inevitable tension between these roles, but that
tension merely reflects the incongruity of privilege law, where we
are willing to sacrifice potentially relevant, probative evidence for
special reasons that have nothing to do with accurate dispute
resolution. Both effective legislative and judicial functions are
essential if the law of privilege is to balance these competing
concerns successfully. Thus, to carry out their functions properly,
legislatures and courts need a better theory of evidentiary privilege.
II. RETHINKING PRIVILEGES AS PROTECTING RELATIONAL AND
INFORMATIONAL INTERESTS
What is a "privilege?" It seems like a simple question, but when
one takes a closer look the question grows increasingly difficult. The
first section of this Part looks at the wide variety of evidentiary
concepts that, at some point, have been called "privileges." The
thrust of this section is to demonstrate the theoretical and doctrinal
confusion that has resulted from inadequate understanding of
privilege law. The second section looks at the traditional rationales
for privilege law and concludes that the "one-size-fits-all" approach
12. See Kirtley, supra note 11, at 20-22 (surveying various circumstances
subject to a "mediation privilege").
13. 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004).
14. McCormick, supra note 1, at 448.
540
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to understanding privilege simply does not work. The final two
sections of this Part set forth a different theory of privilege--one that
posits different rationales for privileges that serve to enhance specific
relationships and privileges that protect interests in specific types of
information-and show the legislative and judicial consequences of
reframing our understanding of privilege in this way.
A. The Confusing Variety of Privileges
There is an extraordinarily wide variety of concepts bundled
under the term "privilege." The most familiar are testimonial
privileges and confidential communication privileges, each of which
can provide absolute or qualified protection.' 5 Alongside these core
concepts, there are a range of doctrines that are referred to as
privileges because they involve concepts of privacy or con-
fidentiality.' 6 These doctrines include the work product "privilege"
and the "privilege" for settlement discussions and offers. 17 This sec-
tion reviews the confusion surrounding these doctrines, relying
primarily on federal and California law to illustrate the problems.
One can begin to see the problem by considering the concept of
"absolute privileges." There are no absolute privileges. Although
the term "absolute privilege" exists, no evidentiary privilege offers
absolute protection, in the sense of an impenetrable shield. All
privileges can be waived by parties, whether intentionally or
unintentionally.' 8 Moreover, virtually all privileges (except perhaps
the mysterious mediation privilege discussed in Part III of this
Article) are subject to multiple exceptions, meaning that even though
a holder of a privilege may want to refuse to provide certain
evidence, as a matter of policy lawmakers could not allow the
evidence to be withheld from the trier of fact. The most famous
example of this principle is the crime-fraud exception, which applies
to many privileges. Where the privileged communication is used to
further a crime or fraud, the protection of privilege vanishes, no
15. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 1.2.1, at 14 (explaining that some
"communication privileges can be overridden by an ad hoc showing of
compelling need for the underlying information").
16. See 1 id. § 1.3 (discussing doctrines related to evidentiary privilege).
17. Id.
18. See e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 912 (Deering 2004) (listing various
circumstances under which the holder of a privilege may waive it).
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matter how much the holder of the privilege wishes to protect the
privileged evidence. 19 Nevertheless, most scholars and commen-
tators divide "absolute" privileges into two categories: testimonial
and confidential communications.
20
Testimonial privileges are the broadest in terms of the scope of
protection. The holder of a testimonial privilege cannot be
compelled to provide testimony on any topic, whether it pertains to
matters observed, matters discussed in confidence, or matters
discussed in public. The most common testimonial privilege is the
spousal privilege.21 The central tenet underlying this privilege is that
the relationship between spouses is sufficiently important such that
no spouse should be forced to testify against the other spouse.
22
Testimonial privileges are frequently confused with other rules
of evidence that flatly prohibit particular witnesses from testifying,
however. For example, California Evidence Code section 703.5 bars
persons in a judicial or quasi-judicial position from testifying in any
subsequent proceeding, and it prohibits mediators or arbitrators from
testifying in a subsequent civil proceeding, with some exceptions.
23
19. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 956 (Deering 2004) (crime-fraud
exception to attorney-client privilege); id. § 981 (crime-fraud exception to
marital confidential communication privilege); id. § 1018 (crime-fraud
exception to psychotherapist-patient privilege).
20. Professor Edward Imwinkelried, author of the treatise, The New
Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges, chose not to address testimonial privileges in
the treatise. However, he noted that Dean Wigmore and the Advisory
Committee that drafted the proposed federal rules of privilege did include
testimonial privileges in the definition of "privilege." See 1 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 10, § 1.3, at 21-22 & nn.3, 15 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
supra note 2 §§ 2175, 2227-45).
21. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43, 46 (1980) (noting the
privilege's ancient roots and the fact that it is recognized by a majority of
states). See generally CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 970-71 (Deering 2004) (defining
the spousal testimonial privilege). Another testimonial privilege grows out of
constitutional law: the privilege of a criminal defendant not to testify and not to
be called as a witness. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Some jurisdictions have also
codified this privilege. CAL. EVID. CODE § 930 (Deering 2004).
22. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. 40 at 53 (stating that the spousal privilege
"furthers the important public interest in marital harmony").
23. CAL. EvtD. CODE § 703.5 (Deering 2004). Another example of a
disqualification statute is CAL. EviD. CODE § 1150, which disqualifies a juror
or any other person from giving testimony (whether the person wants to testify
or not) about "the subjective reasoning process" of the jury. See EILEEN A.
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Yet this type of disqualification statute can be distinguished from
testimonial privileges because disqualification statutes prohibit all
persons from testifying, even those who would wish to testify.24 A
testimonial privilege empowers the holder of the privilege to decide
whether to testify or not.
Testimonial privileges stand in contrast to confidential
communication privileges. A court can compel the holder of a
confidential communication privilege to testify about some matters,
but prohibit testimony about confidential communications the
privilege holder had with specific persons.2 5 In the United States,
these privileges extend only to a few particular relationships:
attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, doctor-
patient, and penitent-clergy. 26  Like testimonial privileges, these
privileges tend to be "absolute," meaning they are only subject to
waiver and exceptions.
27
Some jurisdictions, however, do not grant absolute protection to
certain confidential communication privileges, and these stand out as
anomalies. For example, California recognizes a "sexual assault
victim-counselor" privilege28 and a "domestic violence victim-
counselor" privilege.29  In some ways, these "victim-counselor"provisions are structured after other confidential communication
SCALLEN & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE COURTROOM
MANUAl § 1150, at 670-74 (2004). These disqualification provisions should
be distinguished from "competency" statutes, which declared certain categories
of individuals unfit to testify. The general trend of modem evidence law is to
eliminate categorical incompetence rules, leaving problems with a particular
witness's testimony to go to the credibility of the witness's evidence. See id. §
700, at 227.
24. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 1.3.6, at 45-49 (discussing the
difference between spousal communication and disqualification privilege).
25. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 6.2, at 441; see EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS (4th ed. 1998) (stating
confidential privileges apply in any proceeding in which testimony can be
technically compelled through a subpoena; however the person holding the
privilege may still refuse to disclose the privileged information).
26. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 6.3, at 522-24.
27. Edward J. Inwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with Modern Humanistic
Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 241, 256-57 (2002).
28. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1035-1036.2 (Deering 2004).
29. Id. §§ 1037-1037.8.
544 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:537
privileges in that the communication must be made in confidence
between persons in the specified relationship. 30 The statute applies
to a "victim," a person who alleges a sexual assault or act of
domestic violence and who seeks counseling for the trauma.31 The
privilege applies to the victim's communications made "in
confidence" to a counselor who has had training and education in
counseling these specific victims, or is employed by an organization
that focuses on counseling victims of sexual assault or domestic
violence and is qualified by education and training.32  "In
confidence" means that neither the victim nor the counselor discloses
the information to "third persons other than those who are present to
further the interests of the victim in the consultation or those to
whom disclosures are reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for which the
sexual assault [or domestic violence] counselor is consulted. ' 33 The
holder of the privilege (the victim, a guardian or conservator of a
victim, or a person authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of
the privilege) 34 must claim the privilege or it is waived. The
counselor "may not claim the privilege, however, if there is no
holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by
a person authorized to permit disclosure.
3 5
Yet unlike other confidential communication privileges, both of
these "victim-counselor" privileges can be overcome in a criminal
action by a showing of sufficient need for relevant evidence of the
facts and circumstances involving the alleged sexual assault or act of
domestic violence "if the court determines that the probative value
outweighs the effect on the victim, the treatment relationship, and the
treatment services if disclosure is compelled. 36 With the victim-
30. Id. §§ 1035.4, 1037.2.
31. Id. §§ 1035, 1037, 1037.7.
32. Id. §§ 1035.2, 1037.1.
33. Id. §§ 1035.4, 1037.2.
34. Id. §§ 1035.6, 1037.4.
35. Id. §§ 1035.8, 1037.5.
36. Id. §§ 1035.4, 1037.2 (discussing the balancing test used in the sexual
assault victim-counselor and domestic violence-victim counselor privilege).
However, the sexual assault victim's statements regarding his or her past
sexual conduct or reputation remain absolutely protected. Id. § 1035.4; see also
id. § 1037.2 (discussing a similar balancing test for domestic violence victim-
counselor privilege).
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counselor privileges, the California legislature has tried to create
statutes that accommodate both the desire to protect a therapeutic
counseling relationship, in which confidentiality is perceived as
necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose of the relationship, and
the need for relevant evidence in criminal cases. Yet this mixture of
relational privilege (victim-counselor) and informational privilege
(evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct and facts relating to the
alleged sexual assault or act of domestic abuse) raises questions
about the utility and integrity of those privileges. As will be
discussed more thoroughly in the next section of this Article, the
instrumental rationale of confidential communication privilege (the
belief that the privilege is necessary to encourage the parties to
engage in full and productive communication) has been consistently
questioned and criticized.37 To the degree the instrumental rationale
proves true to any extent, however, it is likely to be undercut by the
recent amendment to the domestic violence-victim privilege that
requires the counselor to inform a victim, either in writing or orally,
of potential limits on confidentiality.
38
Regardless of the utility of the privilege in fostering the flow of
information, the integrity of these privileges is demeaned by singling
out these "special relationships" for protection, but then giving them
second class status. 39 The treatment of these relational privileges
signals a need for more thinking about the function and rationale for
privileges.
In addition to "absolute" privileges, there are many privileges,
adopted by some jurisdictions and not by others, that are subject to
balancing by the trial judge.40 In other words, the judge determines
whether the party seeking to breach the privilege has shown that the
37. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 5.2.2, at 277.
38. Act of Sept. 17, 2002, § 1, 2002 Cal. Stat. 629 (codified as amended at
CAL. EviD. CODE § 1037.8 (Deering 2004)).
39. Indeed, the qualified informational privilege for the facts and
circumstances of the alleged crime is unnecessary, given the defendant's rights
of compulsory process and confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Even
absolute privileges have to give way to these constitutional provisions, if the
defendant shows sufficient need. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, §
11.3.1, at 1263-86 (describing the constitutional balancing test for determining
when the accused's need for evidence may outweigh an exclusionary rule).
40. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 9.3.3, at 1196-98 (describing
methods for balancing).
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need for the information outweighs the values behind the privilege.
In California, for example, the privileges subject to balancing include
trade secrets, 4' the identity of confidential informants, 42 political
votes, 43 newsperson shield laws,44 and self-critical reports. 45 Within
these diverse categories of information, there are no readily apparent
rationales for providing only qualified protection, as opposed to
absolute protection.
Alongside these statutory qualified privileges, some federal
courts have recognized certain governmental privileges, grounded in
the federal constitution or in the official positions created in the
constitution. The most familiar federal "privilege," as some legal
scholars refer to it, and the only one expressly mentioned in the
United States Constitution, is the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 46 This privilege, which applies in civil and criminal
cases,47 guarantees an individual the right to remain silent when
questioned in a custodial context, thereby preventing the potential for
making self-incriminating statements or confessions that would
subject the individual to criminal charges. 48 In this sense, the Fifth
Amendment operates as a type of testimonial privilege, giving the
person claiming "the Fifth" at least the presumptive right not to
testify about certain issues. Similarly, some states have
constitutional doctrines giving rise to privileges. For example, the
California constitution contains an express right to privacy.49 This
provision has been interpreted to privilege certain kinds of
information.50 But one questions whether these are true "privileges."
These provisions stem from the text of the federal or state
41. CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1060-1063 (Deering 2004).
42. Id. §§ 1040-1042.
43. Id. § 1050.
44. Id. § 1070.
45. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, §§ 7.8-7.8.1, at 1115-24.
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note
10, § 1.3.10, at 69-70 (describing the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination as a federal constitutional privilege).
47. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 1.3.10, at 69-70.
48. Id.
49. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (including the right to privacy).
50. See Garstang v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 88-89 (1995)
(holding that the constitutional right of privacy protected communications
made during mediation sessions before an ombudsperson).
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constitutions itself and are not created by a specific branch of
government as is the case with statutory or common law privileges.5'
Moreover, the constitutional texts speak of these provisions not as
"privileges," but as "rights." Whereas a "privilege" may be granted
or withheld by the authority in question, the existence of "right" is
not optional (although the scope of that right may be subject to
interpretation).
Nonetheless, in addition to these questionable constitutional
"privileges," there are privileges, not expressly stated in federal or
state constitutions, but that have been recognized by courts as arising
from the constitutional roles of government actors. These privileges
emerge from a desire to protect information that particular
government offices produce and use, ostensibly to help those offices
carry out their functions. The most familiar of these privileges is the
executive or presidential privilege. 52 In United States v. Nixon, 5 the
United States Supreme Court recognized the existence of the
executive privilege, which rests in part on the doctrine of separation
of powers 54 and the typical concern for confidentiality in
communications between certain individuals.55  Because the
judiciary has its own separation of powers concerns, however, the
Supreme Court rejected the arguments that the president is the sole
judge of whether the privilege applies and that the privilege is
absolute.56 The Court reasoned that, where there has been a showing
of sufficient need for information, the judiciary may order disclosure
of the information to fulfill essential functions, such as adjudicating
criminal proceedings. 57  The scope of the privilege, in terms of
whose communications is protected, is still unclear, but it appears to
apply "when all the communicating parties fall into one of the
51. Cf Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 628 n.3 (Cal. 1984)
(stating holding that California Evidence Code § 911, which permits only the
Legislature to create privileges, "cannot bar privileges based on constitutional
provisions, but does prevent judicial creation of new common law privileges").
52. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 7.6.1; see 26A WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5673.
53. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
54. Id. at 706.
55. Id. at 705-06.
56. Id. at 706.
57. Id. at 707.
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following groups: the President, his or her advisors such as Cabinet
officers, and their staff members. 58  When determining which
communications are protected, it is clear that the privilege protects
only materials created to advise the president on "official
Presidential matters," regardless of whether those communications
occur before, during, or after an executive decision.
59
Although it appears to rest more on instrumental grounds than
separation of powers concerns, a related privilege protects the
"intragovernmental communications by executive officials."
60
Behind this common law "deliberative process privilege" is the
standard rationale that without the privilege, the communications
would not occur and the quality of government decision making
would be hurt.61  Professor Ed Imwinkelried suggests that "the
deliberative process privilege should extend to any executive branch
employee participating in a particular policy deliberation." 62 Yet, the
privilege covers only those parts of documents reflecting the pre-
decisional deliberative process. There is no protection for documents
that rationalize or justify decisions already made.63 Moreover, the
protection is qualified, and if there is, among other factors, a
sufficient showing of relevance, need for information, or seriousness
of the issues involved, the trial judge may order the production of the
information.
64
The governmental privilege that creates the most tension
between the need for relevant, credible, probative evidence and other
societal needs, such as effective security and military operations, is
the absolute privilege for military and state secrets. 65 The rationale
for this privilege remains murky. It appears to have an instrumental
rationale similar to that of other governmental privileges-the
military, diplomatic, and security functions cannot operate
58. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 7.6.2, at 1089-90.
59. 2 id. at 1093 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
60. 2 id. § 7.7.1, at 1099.
61. 2 id. at 1101-63 (summarizing criticism of this argument as well).
62. 2 id. § 7.7.2, at 1105.
63. 2id. at 1108.
64. 2id. §7.7.5, at 1113.
65. See 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5663, at 568-72;
2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, §§ 8.1-8.5, at 1141-75.
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effectively if there information is open to discovery. Yet there also
seem to be "constitutional overtones" 66 to this privilege because of
the need to protect core government functions. The Supreme Court
has, however, refused to comment directly on the constitutional
underpinnings of the state secret and military privilege. 67 The courts
apparently consider this privilege "absolute," in the sense that no
showing of need can justify disclosure of the information. As
Professor Kenneth Graham points out in this Symposium, however,
the nature and the scope of this privilege are so jumbled and
confused, that it deserves far greater scrutiny than courts have been
willing to give.
68
Finally, alongside testimonial, confidential communication and
constitutional privileges (whether they provide absolute or qualified
protection), there are many "quasi-privileges:" doctrines that have
sometimes been labeled as "privileges", yet have origins distinct
from the privileges discussed so far. The most familiar of these
doctrines are the work product doctrine and the exclusionary
evidence rule for settlement offers and discussions.
There is substantial confusion over the nature of and level of
protection for attorney work product.69 One can view work product
as privilege, a doctrine, an immunity, or some other type of
evidentiary protection. Sometimes the same court describes work
product with different terminology. For example, even the United
States Supreme Court has said that work product is-and is not-a
privilege.70  The central point of agreement is that the only work
66. Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 101, 110 (D. Conn. 1991) (citing
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953))
67. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-12 (1953) (acknowledging
that because the military privilege is well established in evidence law, the
Court does not need to address its constitutionality, but rather, simply
determine whether the invocation of the privilege is appropriate for the
occasion).
68. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Government Privilege: A Cautionary Tale For
Codifiers, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 861 (2004).
69. The work product doctrine is recognized in civil cases and criminal
proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2),(b)(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
70. FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1983) (referring to "the work-
product privilege under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); United States
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1975) (stating that the Court created a
"qualified privilege" in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)); Upjohn Co.
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product protected is that which is prepared in anticipation of
litigation. Thus, a transactional lawyer has no right to keep his or her
work product from being discovered or used as evidence in trial,
unless it is also protected by a separate privilege, such as the
attorney-client privilege.
71
There are actually two kinds of litigation work product
protection: the well-known protection for attorney work product and
the lesser known work product protection for experts who are not
expected to testify at trial.72 To promote adequate preparation for
cross-examination, the rule permits broad discovery of the work
product of experts who are identified as potential witnesses at trial.73
Discovery from experts who are not expected to be called as
witnesses is far more limited, however, although still not
"absolute."
74
The traditional rationale for the work product doctrine (my
preferred phrase) is the structure of the American adversary system,
in which the parties pursue the investigation of their cases separately
and eventually present their separate stories interpreting the facts and
law to an independent decision maker. The United States Supreme
v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981)(distinguishing between objections based on
the attorney-client privilege and the "work-product doctrine").
71. See Roger W. Kirst, A Third Option: Regulating Discovery of
Transaction Work Product Without Distorting the Attorney-Client Privilege,
31 SETON HALL L. REv. 229, 230 (2000).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Expert work product is controlled by FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4), which distinguishes between testifying and nontestifying
experts:
(4) TRIAL PREPARATION: EXPERTS.
(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report from
the expert is required under subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition
shall not be conducted until after the report is provided.
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition,
discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be
called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon
a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
73. See id. 26(b)(4)(A).
74. See id. 26(b)(4)(B).
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Court introduced the work product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor,75 a
wrongful death case arising from a tugboat accident in which the
tugboat sank and five crew members died shortly afterwards.76
During discovery, the lawyers representing the father of one of the
dead crew members sought any written or oral statements from
witnesses to the accident as well as any records, reports, or memo-
randa concerning the accident.7 7 The defendants' counsel refused to
produce this information. As a result, the district court held the
lawyer and his clients in contempt.78 Granting writ of certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court held that although the attorney-client
privilege did not cover the materials gathered by the defense counsel
in preparation for trial, 7 9 defense counsel could not be ordered to
produce his work product unless the opponent showed either that he
could not obtain it himself without undue hardship or that he would
be severely prejudiced without the information.
80
The majority opinion and concurring opinion by Justice Jackson
stated four main reasons for protecting attorney work product. First,
the majority opinion in Hickman stated that:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound
to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully
protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing
his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in
which lawyers act within the framework of our system of
75. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
76. Id. at 498.
77. Id. at 499.
78. Id. at 499-500.
79. Id. at 508.
80. Id. at 509.
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jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients'
interests. 8'
The Court expressed multiple concerns about allowing easy access to
such attorney work product. First, it noted that if work product were
discoverable "on mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten." 82  Justice Jackson, concurring,
added, "a common law trial is and always should be an adversary
proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits
borrowed from the adversary." 83 The Court feared that unbridled
discovery of lawyers' files would create a class of parasites who
would prey on any lawyer who dared to memorialize the results of
investigations and strategies or legal theories, and would therefore
damage the adversarial quality of the trial process.
84
Moreover, the Court feared unethical lawyers. The Court stated
that if the opponent was permitted to discover the lawyer's work
product, "sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of
legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial."85 The Court
was silent on what it meant by "sharp practices," but others have
suggested that attorneys might simply edit the files or engage in
selective or strategic production of work product-adding or deleting
documents in efforts to mislead their opponents.
86
Both the majority and Justice Jackson expressed concern that
discovery of an attorney's work product would have a negative
impact on the profession as a whole. The majority was concerned
that such broad discovery would have a "demoralizing" effect.
87
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion fretted about the effect of
discovery on the "welfare and tone of the legal profession."
88
Finally, Justice Jackson cautioned that if the Court did not protect
81. Id. at510-11.
82. Id. at511.
83. Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 516-17 (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. Id. at511.
86. See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REv. 51, 68
(1997) (suggesting that purposely misleading opposing counsel during
discovery is a sharp practice).
87. Hiclnan, 329 U.S. at 511.
88. Id. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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attorney work product then there existed the unseemly possibility
that attorneys would be forced to become witnesses for their
clients.
89
But neither the Supreme Court nor the Advisory Committee, in
later codifying the work product doctrine, provided clear answers to
the true nature of the work product doctrine. 90 Is all work product
available on a showing of need, or does some work product,
representing the "opinions, strategies and theories" of the attorney
receive the status of a "privilege," with absolute protection? The
cases are confusing and unclear.
9 1
Privileges sacrifice relevant, probative, and credible evidence
for the sake of promoting certain social values and policies. It makes
sense, then, that privileges are also confused with another category of
exclusionary evidence rules that serve explicit societal functions
apart from concerns about accuracy or controlling the trier of fact.
Rules 407 through 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 92 exclude
specific kinds of evidence in order to protect or foster certain social
policies.93 The same types of rules can be found in Division Nine of
the California Evidence Code.94 These evidence rules are sometimes
called quasi-privileges or even just privileges. 95  Unlike true
89. Id. at 517 (Jackson, J., concurring).
90. See Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL
L. REv. 720, 762 (1983) (describing the work product doctrine as "a doctrine
of uncertain dimension."); Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical
Analysis of Current Law and a New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L. REv.
385, 386 (1994) (stating "[c]onfusion and disagreement are rampant").
91. Id. Compare Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967
F.2d 980, 984-85 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that opinion work product should be
given absolute protection from discovery), with Holmgren v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating "opinion work
product may be discovered and admitted when mental impressions are at issue
in a case and the need for the material is compelling").
92. FED. R. EViD. 407 (covering subsequent remedial measures); FED. R.
EVID. 408 (covering offers and discussions to compromise a claim); FED. R.
EVD. 409 (covering offers to pay medical expenses); FED. R. EVID. 410
(covering guilty plea later withdrawn); FED. R. EViD. 411 (covering liability
insurance).
93. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: SELECTED RULES OF
LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY (2002).
94. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1100-1160 (Deering 2004) (describing evidence
affected or excluded by extrinsic policies).
95. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 1.3.9, at 60.
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privileges, however, which exclude evidence regardless of its
probative value, these exclusionary rules are also based in part on the
potential weakness in the probative value of the evidence. For
example, Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence excludes
evidence of remedial measures taken after an injury, in part because
the drafters hope to encourage property owners and manufacturers to
make their property and products safer, if possible.96 There is also a
concern about the probative value of such evidence, however: just
because a property owner or manufacturer changes something about
the property or product does not prove that the property or product
was unsafe at the time of the injury. 97 Thus, these rules are ones of
"limited admissibility." 98  The evidence is inadmissible if it is
offered to prove the forbidden issue, such as negligence, culpability,
or liability; if a party offers evidence for any other purpose, however,
it may be admissible. Yet with a genuine privilege there is no
concept of limited admissibility-the evidence comes in or stays out.
The label "alternative dispute resolution" encompasses wide-
ranging efforts to eliminate the need for full-blown civil trials in
many cases. 99  Through various mechanisms, courts and
commentators have attempted to cajole, convince, and order parties
to try to work out their claims outside of the formal courtroom,
leaving those courts free to try serious criminal cases promptly and
handle only those civil trials where all other efforts at resolution have
failed. The schemes for such dispute resolution include: the mini-
trial, summary jury trials, court-ordered arbitration, mandatory
settlement conferences, voluntary settlement conferences, mandatory
mediation, negotiated mediation, mediation plus, and others.too As
96. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note. Professor Imwinkelried
adds that the "self-critical reports" privilege recognized by some courts can be
seen as an expansive reading of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
because such reports often follow some injury or harm and are an effort to
analyze why the event happened and what might have been done to prevent it.
2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 7.8, at 1115-16.
97. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
98. Id.
99. Kirtley, supra note 11, at 7 (stating "[m]ediation is now widely used to
resolve a broad range of conflicts").
100. There is growing body of commentary that describes and evaluates
these procedures. E.g. Robert L. Ebe, The Nuts and Bolts of Arbitration, 22
FRANCHISE L.J. 85, 86-87 (2002); Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age ofArtificial
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these systems for dispute resolution grew in popularity, so did the
development of various provisions designed to ensure confidentiality
in these proceedings.'
0'
The federal rule designed for this purpose is Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 408 excludes offers to compromise
a claim as well as "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations" if the evidence is offered "to prove
liability or invalidity of the claim or its amount."102 The rule does
Legal Reasoning as Reflected in the Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss
Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 173, 188-
200 (2003).
101. See Kirtley, supra note 11, at 5-10 (explaining that the informal nature
of the mediation process makes it a popular but risky method for resolving
disputes) Thus, "[b]efore the widespread enactment of mediation privilege
statutes, several non-privilege theories were advanced to address the need for
confidentiality in mediation." Id. at 10.
102. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration
in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise
not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution.
FED. R. EviD. 408. The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence has
proposed changes to Rule 408 that will become effective on December 1,
2006, if they are approved by the Standing Committee of the Judicial
Conference, the whole Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, and then
Congress does not act to alter the rule:
"First, the proposed amendments provide that statements of fault made
during the course of settlement negotiations are not barred in a
subsequent criminal case. Such statements may be critical evidence of
guilt. Although statements of fault are admissible in subsequent
criminal litigation, an actual settlement is not admissible to prove the
validity or amount of the underlying claim. Second, the proposed
amendments prohibit the use of statements made during settlement
negotiations when offered to impeach a witness through a prior
inconsistent statement or through contradiction. Third, the proposed
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:537
not exclude such evidence if it is offered to prove a different issue,
such as "bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution." 03 The rationales for this rule are that it promotes
and encourages free communication during private settlement
discussions in the hope of reducing the burden on the judicial system,
and that it prevents the jury from giving too much weight to the
evidence on the issue of liability.1' 4 The rule drafters also reasoned
that the probative value of offers to settle, and the discussions
surrounding those offers, is questionable. A party may decide to
settle a claim for many reasons (e.g., to reduce the cost of litigation)
even if the party believes the claim is unfounded.'0 5 Similarly,
California Evidence Code sections 1152106 and 115407 exclude from
amendments bar a party from introducing its own statements and
offers of compromise made during settlement negotiations."
See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM.
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (STANDING COMM.), PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2005/CompleteBrochure.pdf.
Commentators on the proposed amendments have been particularly
critical of the amendment that would allow statements of fault or other
statements made in the course of settlement negotiations admissible in a
subsequent criminal case. Several commentators point out that this provision
could essentially gut the utility of Rule 408, because lawyers would be
reluctant to allow settlement negotiations where there was any possibility of
subsequent criminal proceedings. The Department of Justice, however, is quite
interested in this change, viewing the interest in prosecuting criminal cases as
much greater than the interest in promoting settlement of civil cases. The
comments on the proposed amendments can be read on the Federal Courts's
web site at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Evidence%20Comments.
103. FED. R. EvID. 408.
104. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
105. See id. But see DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE, SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 3.3.2 (2002)
(disputing this proposition by arguing that "compromise evidence usually
satisfies the test of logical relevance. Moreover, such evidence often carries
substantial probative value.... If compromise evidence is to be excluded, such
a rule must be justified, primarily at least, on other grounds.").
106. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1152 (Deering 2004) provides as follows:
(a) Evidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian
motives, furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or any
other thing, act, or service to another who has sustained or will sustain
or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss or damage, as
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pretrial discovery and trial both offers to compromise and the
discussions surrounding those offers if a party offers to prove
liability.1
0 8
The California Evidence Code also recognizes a "mediation
privilege" in sections 1115 through 1128.109 The Evidence Code
lists the mediation privilege in Division Nine ("Evidence Affected or
Excluded by Extrinsic Policies"), which also includes sections 1152
and 1154, rather than in Division Eight, which is entitled
well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is
inadmissible to prove his or her liability for the loss or damage or any
part of it.
(b) In the event that evidence of an offer to compromise is admitted in
an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or
violation of subdivision (h) of Section 790.03 of the Insurance Code,
then at the request of the party against whom the evidence is admitted,
or at the request of the party who made the offer to compromise that
was admitted, evidence relating to any other offer or counteroffer to
compromise the same or substantially the same claimed loss or
damage shall also be admissible for the same purpose as the initial
evidence regarding settlement. Other than as may be admitted in an
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or
violation of subdivision (h) of Section 790.03 of the Insurance Code,
evidence of settlement offers shall not be admitted in a motion for a
new trial, in any proceeding involving an additur or remittitur, or on
appeal.
(c) This section does not affect the admissibility of evidence of any of
the following:
(1) Partial satisfaction of an asserted claim or demand without
questioning its validity when such evidence is offered to prove the
validity of the claim.
(2) A debtor's payment or promise to pay all or a part of his or her
preexisting debt when such evidence is offered to prove the
creation of a new duty on his or her part or a revival of his or her
preexisting duty.
107. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1154 (Deering 2004) provides that:
Evidence that a person has accepted or offered or promised to accept a
sum of money or any other thing, act, or service in satisfaction of a
claim, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation
thereof, is inadmissible to prove the invalidity of the claim or any part
of it.
108. Covell v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1984)
(citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (Deering 2004)).
109. CAL. EvuD. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (Deering 2004).
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"Privileges." '" 0 One reason for this may be that the California
mediation privilege grew out of former California Evidence Code
Section 1152.5, which provided more explicit protection for
communication made in the course of mediation than did Section
1152. 111 Proponents of alternative dispute resolution argued that
rules such as Federal Rule 408 and California Evidence Code Section
1152 provided unsatisfactory protection for communications made
during mediation for several reasons. First, the rules allow for the
admissibility of evidence of offers and discussions in settlement
negotiations if such evidence is offered to prove issues other than
liability.112  As one commentator noted, "[s]ince mediation
discussions tend to be free flowing and often unguarded, revelations
later serving as impeachment, bias or 'another purpose' evidence are
likely.""13  Second, evidence of settlement offers and discussions
may be inadmissible at trial, but it is not clear whether such evidence
is protected from discovery. 14 Finally, evidence rules may not apply
to certain administrative or criminal proceedings, allowing evidence
created in settlement negotiations to be admissible in those
subsequent proceedings."l5 For these reasons, commentators called
for a mediation privilege "of broad unambiguous scope, [which
would] bar discovery, and exclude evidence in all types of
proceedings."' 116 In Part III of this Article, I argue that the critique of
rules such as Federal Rule 408 and California Evidence Code Section
1152 displays conceptual confusion over the rationales for
110. Cf Covell, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (stating that in interpreting CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1152, "[c]ommunications made in the course of settlement discussions
are not 'privileged.' Privileged matters are defined in division 8 of the
Evidence Code, comprising sections 900 to 1070. Section 1152 of the
Evidence Code is contained in division 9. The statutory protection afforded to
offers of settlement does not elevate them to the status of privileged
material.").
111. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1152.5 (repealed 1997).
112. FED. R. EvID. 408; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (Deering 2004).
113. Kirtley, supra note 11, at 13.
114. Id. at 12-13 (asserting that the limited scope of the rule excluding
evidence of compromise negotiations leaves mediation communication"vulnerable to discovery").
115. Id. at 13.
116. Id. at 14.
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privileging some evidence, and, in the case of California, has
produced a statutory scheme that can do far more harm than good.
B. Traditional Rationales for Privileges
This section describes and critiques the most frequently
proffered rationales for "real" (as opposed to the "quasi," discussed
above) privileges. These rationales fall into three categories:
instrumental, humanistic (which include arguments based on both
privacy and personal autonomy), and power. This section concludes
that the traditional rationales do not adequately justify the existence
of "real" privileges, let alone explain or justify the bewildering
variety of "quasi-privileges".
The most common rationale for the existence of privileges is the
instrumental theory. 117 Dean John Henry Wignore is usually
identified as the leading proponent of this theory. 18 The
instrumental theory holds that it is necessary to recognize privileges
to foster the success of socially desirable relationships." 19 The theory
rests on the belief that unless the parties to the relationship are
assured of confidentiality, they will not communicate freely, thereby
endangering the viability and utility of the relationship. 120  The
instrumental theory has an enticing corollary: assuming parties
would not communicate about important issues "but for" the
privilege, then privileges are essentially "cost free" in that they only
exclude evidence that would not otherwise be created.
12 1
117. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 3.1, at 119; see, e.g., Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of
Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317-37, (2003) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges]
(describing the instrumental and humanistic rationales); Developments in the
Law-Privileged Communications, Modes of Analysis: The Theories and
Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1471, 1493-98
(1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (explaining the basic tenets of
the power theory).
118. Developments in the Law, supra note 1 7at 1493-98.
119. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 5.1.1, at 257-59.
120. Id.; 1 Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary
Privileges, supra note 117, at 317.
121. Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 117, at 317-18.
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The instrumental theory has been roundly and soundly
critiqued. 122  The primary charge of critics is that the theory's
underlying belief-that "but for" the privilege, the parties would not
engage in essential communication and the purpose of the
relationship would fail-is an unsupported empirical proposition and
an unwarranted assumption. 12 3 Yet, as at least one critic has noted,
there is also no clear empirical support to the contrary; there is no
evidence proving that clients would still fully disclose information to
their lawyers absent a privilege.
124
The problem with the empirical critique of the instrumental
theory is that it seems impossible to resolve the issue convincingly
one way or the other. 125  Indeed, the very nature of the issue is
incompatible with an empirical methodology. For example, how
does one construct a controlled experiment testing a client's
willingness to disclose difficult matters to an attorney or therapist,
with or without an evidentiary privilege? Would these experiments
have to rely on a hypothetical abolishment of privilege and thus
suffer from the same limitations of artificial jury research? If we
compare jurisdictions without a particular privilege, such as a parent-
child privilege, to jurisdictions with the privilege, would we be able
122. Id. at 320-24 (describing the instrumental theory's major weaknesses).
123. See Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege:
The Weaknesses of the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffe v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 974-82 (1998), reprinted
in 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 5.2.2, at 277-98 (describing and
critiquing the studies evaluating the instrumentalist rationale for privilege).
124. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of
Privilege, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 31, 37 & n.32 (asserting there is no empirical
evidence to show a client would reveal damaging information to a third party
in the absence of a privilege).
125. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-
Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGs L.J.
769, 793 (2002) ("There is little empirical evidence on the value of evidentiary
privileges in promoting the free flow of information in the cases of protected
relationships. Perhaps the best that can be said is that there is little evidence
that the privileges are not effective in providing such protection." (footnote
omitted)). Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1475-76 ("No solid
empirical data exists to support the estimates of either critics or proponents as
to either the costs or the benefits of privilege. In short, legal decisionmakers
face a perhaps unavoidable empirical indeterminacy." (footnote omitted)).
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to generalize from one geographical location to another?
26
Furthermore, can we generalize the research from one type of
privilege, such as the psychotherapist-patient privilege, to other
types, such as the attorney-client or penitent-clergy privileges?1
27
At a minimum, such experiments would have to rely on self-
reporting by the participants because it is logically impossible to
have a confidential discussion when the observed know they are
being observed for research purposes. I question whether such self-
reports are any more reliable than the intuitive assumptions on which
the instrumental rationale now rests.' 28  What incentive would
participants have to self-report accurately? Then again, what
incentive would participants have to lie? And do the participants
understand the difference between promises of confidentiality (in the
sense that the listener will not volunteer or inadvertently disclose the
participant's communication) and privilege (in the sense that the
listener cannot be compelled by a court to testify about the
participant's communication)?
At this point, I could, like some armchair evidence empiricists,
1) simply declare my job as debunker finished, 2) assert that the
126. In other words, would a privilege make more or less of a difference in
confidential disclosures in the notoriously tight-lipped German-Scandinavian
culture of Minnesota than in the famously laid-back, easy-going state of
California? Thus far, there is no reliable research on this issue. On a more
serious note, Professor Imwinkelried criticized a study that suggested
differences in the scope of the spousal privilege that did not appear to make a
difference in the divorce rates of different jurisdictions. 1 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 10, § 5.2.2, at 279 n. 116 (criticizing empirical data reported in 25
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5572, at 484). Professor Imwinkelried
criticized the data because the researchers "made no attempt to control for the
other variables that could plausibly affect the rate." Id.
127. Although I am intrigued by the studies of self-disclosure discussed in
Professor Imwinkelried's article in this symposium, I have the same concern
about how far we can generalize those results to all types of privileges. See
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions
Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on
Self-Disclosure, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 705, 724-33 (2004).
128. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74
WASH. L. REv. 913, 999 (1999) ("Social psychology studies indicate that
people are often unable to say what really motivated them. Thus, empirical
studies relying on self-reporting about whether the existence of a privilege
affected the privilege-holders' behavior are inherently indeterminate.").
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burden of proof is on the other side, and 3) assert that the burden of
proof has not been met. 129 This, however, seems to be taking the
easy way out. The reality is that even if academics are dubious of
the instrumental argument, courts are more than happy to recite it
and rely upon it.' 30 Until courts are as willing to scrutinize the
empirical basis for these assumptions to the same degree as they
scrutinize studies of toxic tort causation, the instrumental rationale is
unlikely to disappear. For this reason, I agree with Professor Ed
Imwinkelried that the better tactic at this point is to try to
supplement, rather than to supplant, the instrumental rationale for
privileges. 131
Where Professor Imwinkelried and I part company, however, is
that he attempts to argue for a "humanistic" rationale of autonomy
that supports a unitary concept of privilege. 132 In the next section, I
129. By "arm-chair evidence empiricist," I mean individuals who have made
careers out of critiquing the lack of empirical evidence behind certain
evidentiary doctrines. However, when the arm-chair evidence empiricist is
confronted with the difficulties of testing some propositions under the
preferred controlled conditions, the critic refuses to suggest how satisfactory
experiments could be designed, because after all, the arm-chair evidence
empiricist is just an expert in evidence law. See e.g., David L. Faigman &
Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39
ARIz. L. REv. 67, 104 (1997) (noting that legal scholars' contention that some
human behavior is impossible to study "shows not only the lack of scientific
imagination of the speakers but also the lack of scientific training of most legal
scholars.").
130. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998)
("Knowing that confidential communications will remain confidential even
after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with
counsel."); Jaffee v. Redmond 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) ("[T]he mere possibility
of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship
necessary for successful treatment.").
131. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, at 13.
132. Professor Imwinkelried outlines his theory in two law review articles
and summarizes them both in his treatise. See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 10, § 5.3.1 (summarizing the author's views on the humanistic
rationale); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of
Evidentiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the
Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 241, 257-61 (2002)
[hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges] (outlining the author's views on humanistic theory); Imwinkelried,
Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 117, at 325-
37 (outlining the author's humanistic theory).
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argue for a bifurcated notion of privilege-recognizing relational and
informational privileges-that rest on separate rationales. First,
though, I want to sketch out Professor Imwinkelried's approach, for I
view my work as supplementing and refining his theory rather than
disputing it.
Professor Imwinkelried argues that the best basis for protecting
privileged communications "is the right to autonomy or decisional
privacy-the right to freedom from control or independent decision-
making."'133  He describes this theory as a "modem humanistic"
approach, as contrasted with "early humanistic" rationales.1
34 He
charts the development of the earliest rationales from the recognition
of the lawyer as a professional who owed a duty of confidence and
trust to the client. 135 The lawyer had an obligation not to reveal the
client's confidences; thus, privilege law developed so that "evidence
law should not require the attorney to do what professional or social
ethics forbade the attorney from doing."'136 As another example, he
cites the early common law's "'natural repugnance"' at forcing one
spouse to testify against "'his intimate 
life partner."" 37
Imwinkelried then argues that in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries Jeremy Bentham's instrumentalism eclipsed these
humanistic rationales as the fundamental basis of privilege law,
ultimately leading Dean Wigmore to reject humanistic recognition of
privilege as "nothing 'more than a sentiment.'
138
Professor Imwinkelried argues that because the instrumental
rationale is so problematic, the grounds of privilege would be
strengthened by revisiting humanistic theory. 39  He notes that
although the early humanistic rationale might have clashed with
instrumentalism, 140 his modem humanistic theory can coexist with
133. Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 117, at 327 (citations omitted).
134. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges, supra note 132, at 244, 257.
135. Id. at 247.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 217).
138. Id. at 250 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 217).
139. See Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 117, at 331-44.
140. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges, supra note 132, at 254. This argument is a bit odd. Imwinkelried
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the instrumentalist rationales for privilege, preserving whatever value
the instrumentalist rationales retain.
1 41
The essence of Professor Imwinkelried's humanistic theory of
privilege rests on a narrow conception of personal privacy, one that
is "grounded in the right to personal autonomy," meaning "decisional
privacy, or freedom from control (as opposed to freedom from
scrutiny)."' 142 Professor Imwinkelried rejects, at least for the time
being, a theory of privilege resting on a general constitutional "right
to informational privacy" that recognizes an "'individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters."' 143  He argues that the
"right does not exist in some jurisdictions; and even where it does
exist, it is ill-defined.' ' 144  For this, and other reasons described
below, I agree that a general "right to privacy" does not help to
rationalize the law of evidentiary privileges.
But although he rejects a generalized notion of "privacy" as a
basis for privilege law, Professor Imwinkelried relies on a narrower
conception of privacy rights. Drawing on liberal democratic theory,
Professor Imwinkelried argues that "personal autonomy is---or at
least approaches-the status of an ultimate value."' 145  Since
individuals do not always know how to maximize their autonomy,
they may turn to professionals or consultants to help them decide
how to make "life preference choices" in a way that maximizes their
personal autonomy. 14 6  Professor Imwinkelried then turns tophilosopher Joseph Raz's argument that the object of government is
notes that the theories clashed because of who was deemed the privilege-
holder. Id. He identifies the professional (such as the attorney or physician) as
the privilege-holder, because the rationale was that the law ought not make the
professional violate his duty of confidence toward the client. Id. at 252-53.
However, this view does not account for the notion of waiver. If privilege
exists to protect the professional from violating his professional obligations,
why would the professional be able to waive that protection? Professor
Imwinkelried is on more stable ground when he makes his case that humanistic
rationales, whether early or modem, should not be dismissed as sentiment.
141. Id. at 266.
142. Id. at 259.
143. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 5.3.2, at 304 (quoting Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 489, 599-600 (1977)).
144. 1 id. at 307.
145. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges, supra note 132, at 259.
146. Id. at 259-60.
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to help individuals maximize their personal autonomy. 147  Thus,
Professor Imwinkelried argues that privilege law can be justified
because it provides the privacy needed to allow individuals to enter
relationships with consultants who will advise them on life
preference choices that maximize their personal 
autonomy. 148
Professor Imwinkelried concludes that, despite differences in the
humanistic rationales, "[iun the final analysis, each theory represents
an effort to vindicate some interest of the layperson rather than of the
consultant."'
' 49
As I noted at the outset, I agree with Professor Imwinkelried's
central point-that privilege law stands on shaky ground if the only
support for it is the instrumental argument that privilege is necessary
to produce certain communications.' 50 This proposition has not been
proven and may not be capable of sufficiently rigorous testing to.... 151
satisfy the current batch of evidence empincists. As with other
evidentiary doctrines,' 5 2 however, the instrumental argument has
become so ingrained in our judicial system that it has taken on a life
of its own;153 and it is unlikely to die at this point-regardless of the
empirical proof that may surface. The question now is whether the
humanistic rationale, as described by Professor Imwinkelried,
provides an adequate justification for privilege, either on its own or
in tandem with the instrumentalist argument.
147. Id. at 260.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 261.
150. Id. at 256-57.
151. See Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1474-75 (noting that,
in evaluating the costs and benefits of privileges, "legal decisionmakers face a
perhaps unavoidable empirical indeterminacy").
152. Another evidentiary doctrine unsupported by empirical research yet
ingrained in our judicial system is the proposition that certain statements, such
as excited utterances and dying declarations, are exempt from the hearsay rule
because of the inherent trustworthiness in these statements. See Elliot B.
Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find Administrative Law
Application, 78 NEB. L. REv. 135, 136-37 (1999) (explaining that evidence
commentators criticize common-law developed exceptions, such as dying
declarations, excited utterances and declarations against interest, for basing the
exceptions on unsupported claims of reliability).
153. Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 117, at 320 (stating that "the instrumental theory enjoys widespread
support among commentators and virtually universal judicial support").
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As I noted above, I agree that a nebulous and generalized "right
to informational privacy" does not sufficiently help to justify the
existence of evidentiary privileges, which keep potentially relevant,
probative information from the trier of fact. In addition, I am
concerned that the humanistic personal autonomy theory also does
not work in its current form. It might justify the professional
privileges, such as attorney-client privilege and doctor-patient or
psychotherapist-patient privilege, in which the protected
communications are limited to the reason the client consulted the
professional and where the client is the holder of the privilege.' 54 In
these situations, it follows that the government enhances the
individual's personal autonomy by providing a privilege for
communications made for the purpose of obtaining professional
advice and by placing control over whether to assert or waive the
privilege in the hands of the person seeking that advice.
The personal autonomy theory does not seem to explain
privileges for other intimate relationships that cover confidential
communications of all kinds and that make both the parties privilege-
holders, however, such as the marital confidential communications
privilege and the clergy-penitent privilege. For example, if one
spouse wishes to assert the marital confidential communications
privilege, the other spouse is barred from testifying about the
confidential communication, even if he or she wants to provide that
evidence. 155 Similarly, the long-standing clergy-penitent privilege
permits the penitent to assert the privilege to prevent the clergy
member from testifying about the confidential communications they
154. See 1 Lmwinkelried, supra note 10, § 6.5, at 535 (a "holder" of a
privilege is a person or entity "authorized to claim the privilege" by the law
establishing the privilege). However, a member of a privileged relationship-
although not the holder-may be required to assert the privilege on behalf of
the holder. This is true, for example, of the attorney-client privilege, where the
attorney must assert the privilege on behalf of the client unless the attorney has
been instructed to waive the privilege. 1 id. The law recognizing a privilege
may also recognize more than one holder. 1 id. at § 6.5.l.a; 1 id. at 548-549,
§ 6.5.3.
155. This assumes, of course, that no exception applies. See, e.g., CAL.
EvID. CODE § 985 (Deering 2004) (stating that no privilege applies in criminal
proceedings in which one spouse is charged with committing a crime against
the other).
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have had.156 In either of these scenarios, it appears that one holder
has the power to deny the other the freedom to disclose information,
a significant barrier to personal autonomy. If privacy or the ability to
keep information confidential is essential to "autonomy or decisional
privacy-the right to freedom from control or independent decision-
making,"'157 so surely is the freedom of expression.
Moreover, the personal autonomy argument does not explain the
bewildering variety of absolute, qualified, and quasi-privileges. Why
do some privileges provide absolute protection from discovery or
admissibility, while others protect information only to a limited
degree, as in the case of qualified privileges or quasi-privileges (such
as work product protection or Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which protects offers and discussions involving
compromise)? 158
Finally, the concept of privacy, whether conceptualized as a
broad "freedom from scrutiny" or as a narrower "freedom from
control," simply does not address the full meaning of evidentiary
privilege law. Evidentiary privileges do prohibit the government
from compelling testimony when the holder asserts a valid privilege.
Yet privileges do both less and more than this. Privileges do less, in
that they cannot prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information
outside of the judicial or administrative law settings. No evidentiary
privilege alone would allow the holder to prohibit the dissemination
of his or her secrets in public.
Privileges also do more than simply limit government intrusion
into individual privacy. Some evidentiary privileges provide the
only significant non-monetary remedy for breach of a fiduciary duty
of confidentiality. Because of certain evidentiary privileges, the
156. See, e.g., id. §§ 1033-34. The traditional rationale for the clergy-
penitent privilege was less the instrumental or the personal autonomy
arguments than that to compel a member of the clergy, who is under a moral
duty to maintain the secrecy of the confessional, would be unseemly.
1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 6.5.1(b), at 550.
157. Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 117, at 327.
158. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-14 (discussing the validity
of the work-product doctrine and the circumstances that necessarily limit the
privilege); FED. R. EvlD. 408 (establishing the limited circumstances in which
evidence regarding compromise or offers to compromise is admissible).
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holder of the privilege may be able to limit the damage done when a
fiduciary has disclosed the confidential information outside of the
privileged relationship. Privilege law allows the holder to mitigate
the damage by preventing the disloyal fiduciary from further
disclosing the holder's secrets in court. Because I see these problems
with the "personal autonomy" rationale as well as with the more
general "freedom from scrutiny" privacy rationale, in the next
section of this Article I accept Professor Imwinkelried's invitation to
"to join in a collaborative effort to frame a sounder normative theory
for the privilege doctrine."'
159
However, there is also a third theory of privileges, one which
focuses on the power of those members of conservative and elite
professions to carve out special areas of protection. 60  Arguably,
lawyers, doctors, psychotherapists, and clergy have benefited from
the shield of privilege as have their clients and parishioners.' 6 1 The
power theory also speaks to privileges that are aimed at protecting
information, such as trade secrets. 162 Yet, because the power theory
explains not only why privileges exist but also how privileges are
created, I discuss the theory in greater detail in the next section.
C. A Theory of Relational and Informational Privileges
As indicated earlier, other theories or rationales of privileges
tend to treat privileges as if they come in one flavor. For example,
even Dean Wigrnore's famous criteria for recognizing a privileged
relationship focuses on only one type of privilege-confidential
communication privileges. 163 Not only were these to be the only
159. Imwinkelried, Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 117, at 317.
160. Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1493-98 (explaining the
basic tenets of the power theory and its implications on privilege law).
161. See id. at 1494 (noting that those who enjoy privileges today comprise
politically powerful professions).
162. Trade secrets are one of the non-constitutional privileges at common
law encompassed under the Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 2 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 10, § 9.2.1, at 1178.
163. Wigmore's requirements for establishing a privilege against disclosure
were:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
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privileges, but they were to be absolutely privileged (only subject to
exceptions or waiver). 164 It could be argued that these-and only
these-types of confidences should be called privileged. We would
abolish all qualified and quasi doctrines of confidentiality and simply
refer to them as "exclusionary evidence rules."'165 Yet if Dean
Wigmore could not limit the concept of privilege in this way, I doubt
I can do much better.
It might, however, be more helpful to the drafters and
interpreters of privileges if we stopped trying to make all privileges
"one-size-fits-all" in terms of their underlying rationales. I suggest
that we divide the world of privilege into at least two categories: one
that focuses on promoting and protecting certain relationships
(relational privileges) and one that focuses on protecting specific
information (informational privileges). My goal in this section is to
show why reorganizing our thinking about privileges in this manner
would help to rationalize and clarify all privileges, whether they are
absolute, qualified or quasi.
Relational privileges include all the common confidential
communication privileges: spousal, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-
penitent, and attorney-client. These relationships are ones that "in
the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered."'
166
Wigmore may have scoffed at humanistic rationales as mere
sentiment,167 but he agreed that there are some relationships that are
so special that "the community" believes they ought to be
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527.
164. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 6.3, at 521.
165. If one wanted to obtain information covered by one of these
exclusionary rules, we might call these procedural techniques "immunity
challenges." Then again, I believe that phrase has been taken, as so much has,
by "reality" television shows.
166. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527.
167. See id. § 2283, at 217.
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"fostered." 168 But this begs the question-why should the
community foster or protect these relationships and not others? Part
of the explanation undoubtedly rests on their quality of intimacy-
exchanges between parties in these relationships often occur in
intensely private moments and about intensely private topics.
69
Moreover, if society is to lose the benefit of these communications as
evidence, it is not surprising that these privileges are limited to those
situations where the parties act to protect their privacy; thus the law
protects only those communications uttered in confidence.1
70
Here is where at least part of Professor Imwinkelried's theory
hits home. The statutory and common law relational privileges share
a common thread. They recognize the reality of vulnerability,
dependence, and trust in certain relationships. It is not surprising
that most of these relationships are also described as relationships of
"confidence and trust," "special relationships," or "fiduciary
relationships."' 7'1 Legislatures and courts may decide to privilege
these relationships not because the privileges encourage the parties to
communicate more freely, but because parties do communicate more
freely in these intimate settings, making themselves more vulnerable
to abuse of their trust.' 
72
168. See id. § 2285, at 527.
169. See id. at 527.
170. See id. at 527-28.
171. See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed.
Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
897, 917-18 & n.87 (1993) (explaining that courts began to refer to
relationships where one vulnerable party entrusts another party with the power
to protect it as "special" or as one of "trust and confidence" to avoid the rigid
classification of the relationship as "fiduciary"). All of these relationships
share the qualities of what I termed "the new fiduciary principle:"
Under the new fiduciary principle, a fiduciary relationship exists when
there is (1) dependence or vulnerability by one party on the other, that
(2) results in power being conferred on the other (3) such that the
entrusting party is not able to protect itself effectively, by "cover" or
otherwise, and (4) this entrustment has been solicited or accepted by
the party on which the fiduciary obligation is imposed.
Id. at 922; see John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws,
84 MINN. L. REv. 505, 557 (2000) (noting that if a lawyer were required to
divulge client secrets, it would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty).
172. See Leslie, supra note 124, at 31 (noting that clients willing to risk
exposure have more reason to confide in their attorney, upon whom they rely
for accurate legal advice).
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It is not surprising that legislatures and courts tend to provide
the highest level of protection--"absolute" protection-for such
relational privileges. The protection is "absolute" in the sense that
the intimacy theoretically cannot be breached by judicial
compulsion, unless the parties to the relationship have been careless
in protecting their intimacy (waiver) or the parties have engaged in
untoward behavior that deprives them of their "privilege" as a matter
of social policy (exceptions). 173 Some may argue that this "absolute"
level of protection is necessary to ensure full and meaningful
communication between the privileged parties because it allows the
fiduciary to reassure the holder of the privilege that the fiduciary
cannot be forced to testify about the communications. Such
arguments are misleading, because despite the alleged "absolute"
protection, the fiduciary cannot predict with certainty that a court
would not apply one of the exceptions to the privilege or find that the
holder of the privilege has waived it, either expressly or impliedly.
In truth, even "absolute" relational privileges are fairly limited.
These privileges merely minimize some of the consequences of
breach of fiduciary duty by refusing to allow the disloyal fiduciary to
compound the betrayal by testifying in court. Moreover, the
existence of a privileged relationship does not prevent a particular
court from mistakenly concluding that the privilege does not apply,
has been waived, or is subject to an exception. In these cases,
evidentiary privilege law provides an ad hoc remedy, excluding the
evidence where a court has erroneously compelled the testimony of
those in the specific "privileged" relationship. 174  While the
availability of these privileges may promote or enhance such
"special" relationships, privilege law does not protect them in a
meaningful way, for the privileges can neither prevent breach of
fiduciary duty nor stop erroneous judicial rulings regarding privilege.
Seeing the fiduciary quality of relational interests helps to
explain why only one party holds certain privileges instead of both
parties. For example, in the attorney-client relationship, the client is
173. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1605, 1605-28 (1986).
174. See CAL. EvlD. CODE § 919 (Deering 2004) (requiring that the holder
has properly asserted the privilege, but a court erroneously compels the
evidence, the evidence must excluded in later proceedings).
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the vulnerable party, not the attorney. 175 The same is true for the
vulnerable patient in the doctor-patient or psychotherapist-patient
relationships. 176 In other relationships, both parties are vulnerable
and dependent on one another and, not surprisingly, in those cases
both parties may be deemed to be holders of the confidential
communication privilege. Spouses place their trust in one another,
the violation of which by disclosure of intimate, confidential
communication can be devastating.' 77 Thus both spouses hold the
marital confidential communication privilege and can assert the
privilege to stop the other from revealing confidences. The fiduciary
concept also explains why the spousal relationship receives even
greater protection in some jurisdictions, where a spouse can refuse to
permit the other spouse to testify about even non-confidential events,
even if the witness spouse is willing to testify. 78 The modem trend,
however, is to give this privilege only to the witness spouse, for in
that circumstance at least the state is not compelling a breach of
fiduciary duty-the witness spouse is given the power to choose
whether to betray or testify against the party spouse.' 79 Without a
doubt, spousal relationships are the most privileged of all the
relationships recognized by privilege law.
This understanding of relational privileges also helps to
reconcile some anomalous privileges. For example, one could argue
that the clergy and penitent share a mutual vulnerability to betrayal
175. Professor Imwinkelried views the professional as potentially vulnerable
as well-the privilege frees the professional to give creative solutions without
concern of ridicule. But this does not follow if the client or the patient wishes
to waive the privilege, they may do so. The attorney, doctor, or therapist,
however, cannot waive the privilege on their own. Imwinkelried, Rethinking
the Foundation ofEvidentiary Privileges, supra note 117, at 336-37.
176. Id.
177. The spousal relationship is not often considered a "traditional" fiduciary
relationship, but it is often called a relationship of "confidential relationship,"
reflecting "the new fiduciary principle." See Scallen, supra note 171, at 906.
178. See Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 449 & n.7 (1938); cf Developments in the
Law-Privileged Communications, Familial Privileges, 98 HARV. L. REv.
1563, 1567 (1985) (noting that fourteen states empower a party to prevent the
adverse testimony of his or her spouse).
179. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1979) (noting the
"trend in state law toward divesting the accused of the privilege to bar adverse
spousal testimony").
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of the confidence of the confessional. Some jurisdictions extend this
privilege only where the tenets of the parties' religion require them
to keep confidential the secrets of the confessional. 180 The priest,
one could argue, would suffer betrayal if the intimate secrets of the
penitent and the counsel of the priest could be compelled by
subpoena. Yet this argument is more forced than that for the marital
confidential communications privilege, so it makes better sense that
many jurisdictions make only the penitent the holder of the privilege,
for the penitent is truly the more vulnerable in the relationship.'
8'
Moreover, if one treats the clergy-penitent privilege as a
relational privilege, the other rationale for the privilege-societal
reticence to punish clergy who refuse to violate the confidence and
betray the trust of the penitent-takes on greater weight. By refusing
to recognize a relational privilege, the state would be compelling a
breach of fiduciary duty. This argument echoes the early humanistic
rationale described by Wigmore as the "natural repugnance" of
forcing a party to testify against an "intimate ... partner."'
182
Although Wigmore dismissed this as mere "sentiment," the
pragmatism of this rationale persists. 83
There are, however, many kinds of information that receive at
least some level of protection from discovery and use as evidence at
trial or other legal proceedings. This is the case even if the
information is not generated as a communication between a fiduciary
and beneficiary. The rationale for these "informational privileges" is
quite different from that of relational privileges. The growth of the
Internet, the wide dissemination of digital information, and the
development of intellectual property law have underscored the reality
that information has real economic and social value. Modem
technology has added to this lesson by showing us all the ways
information can be found, created, packaged, sold, repackaged, and
sold again and again. Although some of this information may
180. See Ronald J. Colombo, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the
Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 233-34 (1998).
181. See Anthony Merlino, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic
Confessional from Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L.
REv. 655, 671 (2002) (noting that a majority of the statutes extend the
privilege solely to the penitent, not to the clergy).
182. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 217.
183. Id.
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:537
receive absolute protection,1 84 virtually all of these privileges are
qualified in the sense that when the privilege is asserted, the court
must balance the need for the information against the cost of
disclosure. Such qualified protection makes sense from a policy
perspective because while the information may have value to the
holder of the privilege, there are serious costs-in terms of the
accuracy of the decision making-to keeping that information away
from the trier of fact.
A theory of "informational privileges" would include both
qualified privileges (such as trade secrets, political vote, self-critical
reports and deliberative privilege), and some quasi-privileges (such
as work product protection). The hallmark of these doctrines is that
they allow the court to balance private interests against societal ones.
This approach is justifiable with informational interests at stake in
that these privileges do not involve fiduciary relationships.
Informational interests arise where parties have invested time,
money, effort, skill, and education to produce information that they
alone wish to possess or to control. The legislature (or court, in the
case of common law privileges) may recognize a privilege in this
case, granting control over the use of that information (in a judicial
setting) because it recognizes that such information has value that the
holder of the privilege wishes to protect against other users. 1
85
To illustrate, it is possible to read the Supreme Court's rationale
in Hickman v. Taylor for a work product doctrine as a defense of an
informational privilege of the kind I describe here. Recall that along
with the instrumental rationales (that without work product
protection, lawyers would not write things down, would engage in
"sharp practices" and would leech off each other's work), the
184. Some might make the case that military and state secrets are so
valuable, that they should receive absolute protection, but others argue
persuasively that even this information should be available to the public upon a
sufficient showing of need. Graham, supra note 68, pt. V.
185. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 313
(noting the if information were to flow freely it would reduce the ability of
those who create it to reap the benefits of their efforts); Daniel R. Fischel,
Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that
elimination of the work-product doctrine would decrease the value of legal
services); cf Richard A. Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the
Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1193 (1977).
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majority was concerned with protecting the attorney's privacy in
producing and using information:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in
which lawyers act within the framework of our system of
jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients'
interests. 186
In other words, a trial attorney's product is the production,
management, and strategic-even artful-use of information. In the
language of business, the mental impressions, strategies, and
opinions of the lawyer are the "value-added" product that the trial
lawyer can "sell" to a client. No wonder the Hickman majority was
worried that broad discovery would have a "demoralizing" effect on
lawyers1 87 and Justice Jackson fretted about the effect on the
"welfare and tone of the legal profession."' 188 If a lawyer's diligence
and intelligence in preparing for trial could simply be stolen with the
blessing of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, well, that would be demoralizing. A full discussion of the
implications of treating work product as an informational privilege
will have to wait for another article. Here, it is enough to suggest
that information gathered for use in litigation has genuine value,
whether it is actually intellectual property or not. The value of this
property is sufficient, courts have argued, to merit restrictions on its
availability for discovery and for use at trial. This is consistent with
a theory of informational privilege.
Not all information currently considered "privileged" would be
so under an informational theory of privilege, however. For
example, evidentiary rules protecting offers of settlement and
settlement discussions from being used as evidence of liability, such
as Federal Rule of Evidence 408 or California Evidence Code section
1152, have sometimes been called the "privilege" for settlement
discussions. Yet, these rules-while promoting the social policy of
186. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
187. Id. at 511.
188. Id. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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encouraging settlement out of court-would likely not be considered
"informational privileges." Information about settlement offers and
discussions surrounding settlement might have genuine value to
some parties, but the structure of the rule puts the use of that
information in the hands of the party seeking to introduce the
evidence-not the party who seeks to protect the confidentiality of
the information. For example, under these rules, the party seeking to
introduce such information can avoid exclusion of the evidence by
offering the evidence for any purpose other than proving liability-
such as "proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution." 89 The admissibility of the evidence
thus depends solely on its probative function. There is no balancing
of the need for the information against the social policy behind the
rule; Rule 408 simply calls for the court to make a judgment about
classification-is this evidence being offered to prove liability or
something else? The point is that a true informational privilege
would allow the judge, on a sufficient showing of need for the
evidence, to override the "social interest" in restricting the disclosure
of the information in court.
D. The Legislative and Judicial Consequences of Recognizing
Relational and Informational Privileges
The problem with the rationales for both relational and
informational privileges is that they are not self-evident and self-
effectuating. The persons empowered to create privileges must be
persuaded that 1) certain relationships are fiduciary in quality and are
sufficiently significant to deserve the highest level of evidentiary
protection 190 and 2) certain types of information have economic or
other value that deserves to be protected. But who gets to decide
which relationships and what information deserves protection? This
raises a final rationale for privilege-the power theory. This theory
posits that privileges are just that-the rewards of the elite and the
189. FED. R. EvID. 408.
190. Because while we may protect some, we do not endow all fiduciary
relationships with a privilege. For example, business partners are deemed to
be in a fiduciary relationship, but there is no "business partner-business
partner" privilege.
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powerful who can influence and persuade those in authority to create
privileges.19' One can view this theory as voicing nihilistic and
radically skeptical concerns, 192 but one can also recognize the
pragmatism of the power theory. There will certainly be line
drawing when it comes time to decide just who deserves what. And
this is why we have legislators and judges. It is simply naive to
believe that the statement of pure theory-whether instrumental or
humanistic-is all that is necessary to clear the confusion about
privileges. These theories can only be helpful if they are accurate
and if the drafters and interpreters of privileges are sufficiently
educated and interested in the reasons for and consequences of the
work before them.
The ultimate cynic's view is that the only interest legislators and
judges have is in who will support their reelection, appointment or
elevation to higher office. 193 I do not subscribe to this radically
skeptical view, although I understand the pressures on all law makers
and interpreters. I know that certain groups have lobbied long and
hard to procure "privilege" for their professions and the professional
services that they employ. One response is that this is the way the
messy work of democracy gets done. But another response is that if
the stakes were transparent, because of a clear focus on the relational
and informational interests at stake, there would be more
accountability and less ability to hide one's value choices in creating
specific privileges, their exceptions, and conditions for waiver.
Perhaps greater transparency and accountability is the most we can
realistically expect from the current system of government.
In summary, if we were to recognize a theory of relational and
informational privileges, it would be easier for lobbyists for
particular privileges to make their cases-and easier for opponents of
those lobbyists to make theirs-as long as we understand that what is
191. Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1493-95; see 26 WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 9, §5663, at 569 (suggesting that governmental
privilege is supported by a collectivist rationale "that [the] interests of the state
prevail over the interests of the individual").
192. See Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1494-95 (noting that
the heart of the power theory is its "attack on the integrity of both the
traditional justification and the privacy rationale").
193. Cf id. at 1494 (noting that most modem privileges are statutory,
requiring exercise of political power).
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at stake is in essence a value choice. Which relationships involve
fiduciary qualities and which do we value most?1" What
information has sufficient value to warrant protection? Recognizing
the difference between relational and informational interests also has
implications for deciding the degree of protection; there is a
significant difference in creating a relational privilege, with
"absolute" protection (subject only to waiver and exceptions), versus
an informational privilege that can be pierced by a sufficient showing
of need. In the final part of this Article, I try to show how one
legislative and judicial effort-in California-went awry in the
creation of a mediation privilege. I hope to clarify the issues at stake
so that other jurisdictions may avoid this problem and so, in the case
of California, an appropriate legislative solution can be created.
III. THE MYSTERIOUS MEDIATION PRIVILEGE: PROTECTING
RELATIONAL OR INFORMATIONAL INTERESTS?
Mediation is booming business, along with many other kinds of
alternative dispute resolution. 195  According to advocates of
mediation, the essential ingredient of successful mediation is
confidentiality. 196 But what do they mean by confidentiality-and
194. In my earlier article, I argued that "fiduciary relationships" are far more
fluid than courts sometimes lead us to believe. Scallen, supra note 171, at 901.
Thus, I am not suggesting that relational privileges would always be limited to
those we now view as "traditional" fiduciary relationships. As our
understanding of the fiduciary principle grows, our legislatures and courts may
recognize additional relationships worth protecting. The most obvious
example is the relationship between same-sex couples.
195. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution:
New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 415-21 (1997) (providing an
overview of the growth of alternative dispute resolution in a section entitled
"The Context: A Brief Intellectual History of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Legal Ethics").
196. For example, a California court of appeal noted that without assurances
of confidentiality "some litigants [would be deterred] from participating freely
and openly in mediation." Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 161 (Ct. App.
1994). The Ryan court also quoted approvingly the conclusion of a practice
guide that stated, "[c]onfidentiality is absolutely essential to mediation....
Otherwise... parties would be reluctant to make the kinds of concessions and
admissions that pave the way to settlement." Id. (quoting JUDGE H. WARREN
KNIGHT ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION § 3:25, at 3-5 (1993)).
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exactly how much confidentiality is required? The California
Supreme Court provided no helpful answer in Rojas v. Superior
Court197 when it held that the California mediation privilege
absolutely protected-from discovery and from use at trial-all
material "made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a
mediation or a mediation consultation," even offered in subsequent
litigation. 198 I argue here that the California Supreme Court should
not have construed the statute so broadly, but since it has, the
California legislature must now correct and clarify the contours of
the mediation privilege, a project which can benefit from the
distinction between relational and informational privileges.
Moreover, because many jurisdictions have enacted mediation
privileges, the lessons of the Rojas case can have an impact beyond
California.
In the Rojas case, several hundred tenants of a Los Angeles
apartment complex sued the owner and developers after learning that
the owner had settled a separate lawsuit against the developers
concerning mold and water leaks in the complex. 199 The tenants
sought to discover materials documenting the mold and water
leakage, which had been cleaned up by the time they brought suit,
but the Los Angeles County Superior Court denied their request.
200
The trial court concluded that the defendants created the materials for
the purpose of mediation between the owner and developer, and thus
the materials were confidential under California Evidence Code
section 1119.201 Section 1119, which is the heart of the California
mediation privilege, provides that neither evidence of oral
197. 93 P.3d 260 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
198. Id. at 270-71.
199. Id. at 262-63.
200. The tenants sought:
[p]roduction of all photographs (and negatives) and videotapes taken
or received during the underlying action, "all recorded statements" of
former or current tenants obtained in that action, all "results" from
destructive testing during that action, and all "raw data" collected
during that action from "air sampling for mold spores," "bulk
sampling of mold spores," and "destructive testing."
Id. at 263. "Coffin, Ehrlich, and Deco opposed the motion, arguing in part that
all of the requested documents were undiscoverable under section 1119
because they were prepared for the mediation in the underlying action." Id.
201. See id. at 264.
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statements, including admissions, nor writings20 2 that are "made for
the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a
mediation consultation [are] admissible or subject to discovery, and
disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration,
administrative adjudication, civil action, or other non-criminal
proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to
be given."
20 3
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that section 1119 protects
only "the substance of mediation, i.e., the negotiations,
communications, admissions, and discussions designed to reach a
resolution of the dispute at hand,"204 not the photos and test data,
which the tenants sought in order to prove that they had been
exposed to mold.0 5 The Court of Appeals reasoned that to read
Section 1119 literally would render Section 1120 of the Evidence
Code superfluous. 20 6  Section 1120 provides that "[e]vidence
otherwise admissible or subject to discovery outside of a
mediation.., shall not be or become inadmissible or protected from
disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in a
mediation."
20 7
The appellate court held that raw test data and photographs, to
the degree they can be separated from mediation communications,
are analogous to fact work product, which is discoverable upon an
202. The term "writings" is defined broadly in Section 250 of the California
Evidence Code as:
"Writing" means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating,
photographing, photocopying, transmitting by electronic mail or
facsimile, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing,
any form of communication or representation, including letters, words,
pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof, and any record
thereby created, regardless of the manner in which the record has been
stored.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 250 (Deering 2004).
203. Id. § 1119(a)(b).
204. Rojas v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 107-108 (Ct. App.
2002), rev'd, 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004).
205. Rojas, 93 P.3d at 262-63 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120 (Deering
2004)).
206. Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120 (Deering 2004)).
207. Id.
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adequate showing of need.20 8 The court outlined the different levels
of protection, using the work product analogy:
In California, the distinction between "derivative" and
"non-derivative" material is the analytic framework applied
to determining whether materials are protected by the
attorney work-product doctrine. Three levels of protection
exist. Core work product, i.e., material solely reflecting an
attorney's "'impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
research or theories,"' is entitled to absolute protection from
discovery. Qualified protection exists for work product
which is an amalgamation of factual information and
attorney thoughts, impressions, conclusions. Such
derivative material would include charts and diagrams,
audit reports, compilations of entries in documents, records
and other databases, appraisals, opinions, and reports of
experts employed as non-testifying consultants. Derivative
work product will be ordered disclosed if denial of
discovery would unfairly prejudice the other party or result
in an injustice. The party seeking disclosure must
demonstrate good cause, which involves a balancing of the
need for disclosure against the purposes served by the
work-product doctrine. Lastly, purely factual material
receives no work product protection.
20 9
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the mediation privilege, which
does not preclude the admissibility or discovery of evidence that is
otherwise admissible,210 "closely mirrors" the work product doctrine;
thus, the court should "read [the mediation privilege] to protect
materials in [the] same manner as the work-product doctrine."
21'
Applying this theory to the facts at hand, the court concluded
"that non-derivative material, such as raw test data, photographs, and
witness statements, are not protected by section 1119.,,212 The court
also found that "derivative" material is "discoverable only upon a
showing of good cause, which requires a determination of the need
208. Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108-09.
209. Id.
210. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120 (Deering 2004).
211. Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
212. Id.
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for the materials balanced against the benefit to the mediation
privilege obtained by protecting those materials from disclosure."
213
Because the tenants seeking discovery had not been parties to the
earlier proceeding and did not have access to the evidence that was
now destroyed, the court ordered not only the production of the non-
derivative material, but also any material that could be separated
from either a compilation or charts prepared for mediation.
214
Finally, the court noted that because the evidence no longer existed,
"it may be appropriate that [the tenants] be given amalgamated
materials if such materials cannot easily be broken into their
protected and non-protected components" and ordered the trial court
to make these determinations through in camera review.
215
The California Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's
reasoning.216 The court concluded that Sections 1119 and 1120 can
be read together to conclude that evidence obtained for mediation "is
not protected 'solely by reason of its introduction or use in a
mediation' 2 17 but is protected only if it was 'prepared for the purpose
of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.' 2 18 The court
agreed with the appellate court that the mediation privilege might not
automatically cover "raw data," such as a mold spore sample, not
because it is "non-derivative," however, but rather because it is not a
"writing" "prepared for the purpose of... mediation." 219 Thus, the
Court held that "photographs, videotapes, witness statements, and
'raw test data' from physical samples collected at the complex-such
as reports describing the existence or amount of mold spores in a
sample" are absolutely protected from admissibility and discovery,
even in a subsequent action, if they were "prepared for the purpose
of, in the course of, or pursuant to, [the] mediation.
' 220
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Rojas, while
controversial, should not come as a complete surprise. In Foxgate
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 262 (Cal. 2004).
217. Id. at 266 (quoting CAL. EviD. CODE § 1120 (Deering 2004)).
218. Id. (quoting CAL. EvrD. CODE § 1119 (Deering 2004)).
219. Id. at 265.
220. Id. at 270.
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Homeowners' Ass 'n v. Bramalea California, Inc.,22 1 the California
Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in creating a
judicial exception to the confidentiality requirements of sections
1119 and 1121 (regarding confidentiality of a mediator's reports and
findings).222 The Court noted that "confidentiality is essential to
effective mediation, a form of alternative dispute resolution
encouraged and, in some cases required
223 by, the Legislature. ' 224
"[T]he purpose of confidentiality is to promote 'a candid and
informal exchange regarding events in the past.... This frank
exchange is achieved only if the participants know that what is said
in the mediation will not be used to their detriment through later
court proceedings and other adjudicatory processes.' 225 Therefore,
to encourage mediation by ensuring confidentiality, the statutory
scheme (which includes section 1119) "unqualifiedly bars disclosure
of communications made during mediation absent an express
statutory exception. ' 226 "Because the language of sections 1119 and
1121 is clear and unambiguous," the court reasoned, "judicial
construction of the statutes is not permitted unless they cannot be
applied according to their terms or doing so would lead to absurd
results, thereby violating the presumed intent of the Legislature.
'" 227
221. 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
222. Id. at 1125.
223. The California Law Revision Commission cites the following examples
of specialized mediation confidentiality provisions: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 467.4-467.5 (community dispute resolution programs), 6200 (attorney-
client fee disputes); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.371 (international
commercial disputes), 1775.10 (civil action mediation in participating courts);
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1818 (family conciliation court), 3177 (child custody);
CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 54453 (agricultural cooperative bargaining
associations); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11420.20-11420.30 (administrative
adjudication), 12984-12985 (housing discrimination), 66032-66033 (land
use); CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.80 (earthquake insurance); CAL. LAB. CODE §
65 (labor disputes); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350 (dependency mediation).
CAL. L. REvISION COMM'N, STATE OF CAL., 1997-98 ANNUAL REPORT
app. 5, § 1119 comment, at 600, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/publications/printed-
reports/pub 196-1997ar.pdf.
224. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1126.
225. Id. (citations omitted).
226. Id. (footnote omitted).
227. Id. (citations omitted). Section 1119 was also interpreted in Eisendrath
v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716 (Ct. App. 2003). In Eisendrath, a
couple reached a mediated divorce settlement containing provisions regarding
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Although it appears to be a model of judicial restraint, the Rojas
court's statutory interpretation is actually far broader than necessary
and raises far more questions than it answers. Under its ruling,
otherwise discoverable documents and test data become absolutely
privileged if they are "prepared for the purpose of' mediation. Yet,
what if the material is prepared for dual purposes-mediation and, if
necessary, trial? Who has the burden of proving that the material
was "prepared for the purpose of' mediation? In these days of
alternative dispute resolution and the "vanishing trial, ' 228 is there
ever a time when material is arguably not developed for "mediation,"
especially given the broad definition of that term in section 1115?"
22 9
the effect of remarriage on spousal support . Id. at 717-18. When the ex-wife
remarried, a question arose about whether the written settlement agreement
accurately reflected the parties' intentions. Id. Thus, the ex-husband filed a
motion to clarify the spousal support agreement. Id. at 718. The ex-wife
opposed the motion, stating that the written document accurately reflected the
parties' agreement. Id. at 719. She attempted to depose the mediator to
support her contention, arguing that the "mediation confidentiality" provisions
could be waived by a party to the mediation, much like any other evidentiary
privilege. Id. Moreover, she argued that her ex-husband had "impliedly
waived" the privilege by filing a motion to clarify the support agreement. Id.
The Court of Appeal rejected the ex-wife's argument that the mediation
confidentiality provisions, similar to the attorney-client privilege, could be
waived. Id. at 724. Relying on statutory interpretation arguments, the court
reasoned "that the implied waiver provisions in sections 912, by their plain
language, are limited to the particular privileges enumerated therein." Id. The
court also interpreted section 1119 broadly, rejecting the ex-husband's view
that conversations between him and his former wife, which took place outside
the presence of the mediator, were admissible. Id. at 725. The court reasoned
that, because section 1119 protects communications made "pursuant to" a
mediation, the privilege covers those conversations even though they occurred
outside of the mediator's presence. Id. The court relied on the fact that the
discussions occurred before the end of mediation and were "materially related
to the mediation." Id.
228. Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuDIES 459
(2004) (discussing, inter alia, data suggesting that the sharp reduction in cases
ultimately resolved at trial may be largely due to the trend toward alternative
dispute resolution).
229. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1115 (Deering 2004) sets forth the following
definitions:
(a) "Mediation" means a process in which a neutral person or persons
facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.
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Thus, any evidence arguably found, sought or created "for the
purpose of' or "pursuant to" mediation could be shielded forever.
230
As a result, the Rojas decision has been heavily criticized, even by
those who favor mediation as a means of alternative dispute
resolution, because they fear that the decision will make parties less
likely, rather than more likely, to mediate.
231
Both the California Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
Rojas purported to apply the principles of statutory interpretation to
determine the meaning of the mediation privilege. 232 The California
Court of Appeals arguably had the better theoretical idea when it
tried to narrow the mediation privilege to an informational privilege.
Although the California Supreme Court repeatedly criticized the
appellate court for its "narrow interpretation" of the mediation
privilege in Rojas,233 the appellate court was trying to be faithful to
(b) "Mediator" means a neutral person who conducts a mediation.
"Mediator" includes any person designated by a mediator either to
assist in the mediation or to communicate with the participants in
preparation for a mediation.
(c) "Mediation consultation" means a communication between a
person and a mediator for the purpose ofinitiating, considering, or
reconvening a mediation or retaining the mediator.
230. Cf Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-
Connected Mediation-Tensions Between the Aspirations of A Private
Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 38 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 509, 514 (2004):
The courts' reluctance to supervise the mediation process, for fear that
it will become less efficient in getting rid of cases, creates a virtually
unregulated enclave of adversarial activity within a process loosely
defined as conciliatory and facilitative. This dissonance can create,
and has created, both confusion and an unfair process.
231. California's Top Court Endorses Mediation Law, but ADR
Professionals Remain Split About the Decision, 22 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 127 (2004) (noting that for many ADR professionals, the reaction
to the Rojas Supreme Court opinion "changed almost instantaneously from
'What did it say?' to 'How are we going to fix this?'); Jeff Kichaven,
Commentary: Exalting "Absolute Confidentiality" Hurts the Practice, 22
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 127 (2004) (suggesting that the absolute
confidentiality upheld by the Rojas decision could lead fewer parties to agree
to mediate because it would prevent disclosure of any kind of misconduct by
the mediator, among other problems).
232. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270 (Cal. 2004); Rojas v.
Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 105 (Ct. App. 2002).
233. Rojas, 93 P.3d at 266, 269-70.
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the hornbook principle when construing privileges that .' [p]rivileges
should be narrowly construed since they prevent the admission of
relevant and otherwise admissible evidence." ' 134  The Court of
Appeals attempted to limit the privilege to oral and written
communication between the participants, stating that "section 1119
does 'not protect pure evidence,' but protects only 'the substance of
mediation, i.e., the negotiations, communications, admissions, and
discussions designed to reach a resolution of the dispute at hand."'
235
The appellate court reached this narrow interpretation by de-
emphasizing the section 1119 term "writings" and highlighting the
term "evidence" in the exception provided by section 1120, which
states that evidence that is otherwise discoverable or admissible is
not protected by section 1119.236 Thus the appellate court held that
photographs, videos, and test results-whether in raw or compilation
form-were items of "evidence" that could be discoverable. 2 3' The
appellate court reasoned that such evidence might still be subject to
work product protection, which gave rise to the section of the
opinion comparing the mediation privilege to the work product
doctrine.
238
Regrettably, however, the Court of Appeals exceeded its power
in its effort to narrow the scope of the privilege. As the California
Supreme Court recognized in a previous decision, "the privileges set
out in the Evidence Code are legislative creations; the courts of this
state have no power to expand them or to recognize implied
exceptions. '' 239  Moreover, the California Supreme Court could not
234. Jurcoane v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 490 (Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting People v. McGraw, 190 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463 (Ct. App. 1983)).
235. Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
236. Id. at 107-08.
237. Id. at 106.
238. Id. at 108-110.
239. Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal. 2000).
See Rojas, 93 P.3d at 423-24 (the "good cause" exception for work product
prepared in anticipation of litigation is controlled exclusively by CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 2018(b)). The Rojas Court stressed that
the Legislature clearly knows how to establish a "good cause"
exception to a protection or privilege if it so desires. The Legislature
did not enact such an exception when it passed Evidence Code section
1119 and the other mediation confidentiality provisions.
Rojas, 93 P.2d 3d at 423.
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condone the appellate court's attempt to read away the term
"writings" in section 1119. Photographs and videos certainly fall
under the broad definition of writings in California Evidence Code
Section 250, as would any expert analysis of raw mold samples.
240
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that because section
1119 plainly stated that it protects such "writings" from discovery or
admissibility if prepared for the purpose of mediation, the Court of
Appeals had altered the scope of section 1119 through its
interpretation of section 1120.41
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court might have helped
litigants and lower courts had it narrowed its own interpretation of
the statute. The court made no effort to explain how a lower court
should interpret the language in section 1119, "prepared for the
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation." The court's
decision not to address the question may be attributed to the
procedural posture of the case. The parties settled the case after the
decision of the Court of Appeals. 242 Thus, the factual question that
the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court-questioning which,
if any, of the materials the tenants were seeking had been "prepared
for the purpose of' mediation-was rendered moot.
243
Still, the California Supreme Court decided to retain jurisdiction
because the case "raise[d] issues of continuing public importance."
244
In that vein, the Supreme Court could have provided a narrower but
less tortured interpretation than that provided by the Court of
Appeals. Specifically, the Supreme Court might have addressed the
appellate court's concern that the mediation privilege shields
otherwise admissible evidence simply because a party can claim that
the tests or photographs were "prepared for the purpose of, in the
course of, or pursuant to, mediation." The court might have pointed
out that a party who seeks to claim the benefit of a privilege has the
burden of proving that it applies. Thus, a party who asserts that
evidence is protected by section 1119 should have the burden of
240. See Rojas, 93 P.3d at 265.
241. Id. at 266.
242. Id. at 271.
243. See Rojas, 93 P.3d at 271 n.9.
244. Id. at 264 n.3. The discovery requests were also relevant in pending
litigation among some of the co-defendants. Id.
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proving the parties created it "for the purpose" of mediation, in the
course of," or "pursuant to" mediation. In other words, a fair but
narrower interpretation of section 1119 is: "but for" the mediation,
would this evidence have been created? Was this evidence produced
because of mediation, or were there other reasons to make the photos
and videos and to take mold samples, such as gathering evidence for
use in litigation? By reading section 1119 narrowly, the court could
have eliminated the scenario sketched out by the Court of Appeals:
"Parties could simply agree to mediate, introduce all their evidence,
and then refuse to settle, and claim privilege." 245 The appellants in
Rojas actually argued for this narrower, "but for" interpretation of
section 1119. 24 6 Nonetheless, the court did not address the argument,
preferring an absolutist interpretation of section 1119.
As the Supreme Court pointed out, there are no traditional types
of exceptions and no waiver provisions to section 1119, except for
the "supermajority" requirement that all of the parties to the
mediation have to agree in writing to allow disclosure of the
information. 247  This effectively creates a "super-privilege"--
impenetrable by public policies favoring disclosure (exceptions) or
by the lack of interest in protecting confidentiality, as shown through
their carelessness or their reliance on the material (waiver).
The only way around the problem for the courts was to narrow
the circumstances in which section 1119 applies. That is why the
Court of Appeals tried so hard to limit section 1119 by reference to
the work product doctrine.248 But the Supreme Court could also have
helped narrow the privilege through judicial interpretation-squarely
placing the burden of proof on the party claiming the privilege to
prove that the evidence would not exist "but for" the mediation.
California courts do what they can with the mediation privilege,
but in California the ultimate responsibility for defining privileges
245. Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109.
246. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Rojas, 93 P.3d 260 (No. S111585), 2003
WL 1918567. This "but-for" interpretation is heavily criticized in Laura A.
Miles, Comment, Absolute Mediation Privilege: Promoting or Destroying
Mediation By Rewarding Sharp Practice and Driving Away Smart Lawyers?,
25 WHTIER L. REv. 617, 635-639 (2004).
247. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122 (Deering 2004)
248. See Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108-10.
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rests with the legislature. 249 In fashioning the statutory scheme of
sections 1115-1128, the legislature created a "super" relational
privilege for mediation, more powerful than any other privilege, even
the spousal testimonial privilege.2
So what exactly is the mediation privilege-a relational
privilege or an informational privilege? As currently drafted by the
California legislature and interpreted by the California Supreme
Court, the mediation privilege is a mystifying blend of both. Given
the absolute quality of the mediation privilege as interpreted by the
California Supreme Court and the emphasis on fostering
communication between parties and a mediator, one might argue that
the mediation privilege is a relational privilege. Like other
confidential communication privileges, it protects communications
made "for the purpose of' mediation as well as those made during
and "pursuant to" the mediation.251  Moreover, the mediation
privilege is grounded in the same instrumental rationale that grounds
confidential communication privileges: participants will not be
forthcoming if they are not assured that information they provide will
be kept confidential.252
There are, however, several significant ways in which the
mediation privilege is distinguishable from a confidential
communications privilege. First, there is no requirement of
confidentiality for writings or oral communication "made for the
purpose of' or "pursuant to" mediation.253 All of Los Angeles could
have watched the testing or photographing and demolition of the
allegedly mold-ridden building, or heard about it from any of the
parties to the Rojas mediation. Yet, under the California Supreme
Court's ruling, the results of the testing and the documentation of the
building's condition would be forever shielded from use by a trier of
fact. The California legislature provided a confidentiality
249. CAL. EvID. CODE § 911 (Deering 2004); Garstang v. Superior Court, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 87 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating that statutory privileges are
exclusive and courts are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial
policy).
250. CAL. Evil. CODE §§ 970-73 (Deering 2004). At least the spousal
testimonial privilege can be waived and there are exceptions to it.
251. CAL. LAW REvISION COMM'N, supra note 223, app. 5, at 599.
252. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 256-60.
253. Id.
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requirement only for "communications, negotiations, or settlement
discussions by and between participants." 254  The holders of the
mediation privilege can, however, unlike the holders of a
confidential communication privilege, allow or participate in the
disclosure of the information outside of the so-called "privileged
mediation" without judicial consequences. 255 How can the privilege
serve to enhance a relationship by providing a remedy for betrayal of
confidence when there is no requirement that the information be
confidential (and thus, no duty that can be betrayed)?
A related argument is that if the mediation privilege is a
relational privilege, it is the only one to date that does not stem from
a fiduciary relationship, whether under traditional or new models of
fiduciary principles. Despite the conciliatory tone of mediation, the
relationships between parties to a dispute remain adversarial until the
256dispute is resolved. To reach a productive outcome, a mediator
may seek to earn the confidence and trust of the participants, and
some parties may disclose sensitive information to the mediator, but
the vulnerability and dependence required for a fiduciary relationship
is not an essential quality of mediation. Parties do not need the
mediator to resolve their dispute. Mediation is, after all, a means of
alternative dispute resolution. Mediation is a confrontational process
(although that phrase need not suggest a contentious or angry
process). Thus, the qualities of personal or professional dependence
and vulnerability that mark other relationship privileges (such as
psychotherapist-patient relationship or attorney and client
relationship) are missing from the mediator-party relationship.257
254. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119(c) (Deering 2004).
255. An attorney or mediator may suffer complaints and discipline by a
professional group for violating such a privilege, but this is not clear.
Moreover, while mediators may subscribe to certain codes of conduct, there is
no universal overseer of mediators, the way state bar organizations may
oversee attorney conduct.
256. Thompson, supra note 230, at 515 ("The desire to win by seeking every
permissible advantage through adversarial argument, persuasion, and
intimidation is deeply imbedded in the hearts and minds of participants in the
litigation process.").
257. Moreover, the mediation privilege, even as currently drafted, does not"protect" the relationships in mediation, whether they are fiduciary
relationships or not. As argued earlier in Part II, section C, the most any
evidentiary privilege can do is attempt to prohibit the state from requiring
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Finally, the mediation privilege differs from relational privileges
in one more way. As the mediation privilege is currently structured,
there are multiple holders of the mediation privilege-the parties,
their representatives, and the mediator.2 58  Any one of these
participants can assert the privilege to attempt to stop the material
from being discovered or being admissible.259 Even if one of the
parties feels aggrieved by the conduct of the mediator or another
participant, the evidence of what has occurred in the mediation
remains under the shield of the mediation privilege unless all
participants agree to make the information public. 260 Thus, unlike
current relational privileges, a party to the mediation privilege has no
power to unilaterally waive the privilege.261 Although there can be
joint holders of traditional relational privileges, such as the marital
confidential communication privilege or the attorney-client privilege,
in the event of a dispute between joint holders of a privilege, these
privileges vanish by operation of exceptions. 262  To put it another
way, in a "dispute" between two holders of the "privilege" (the very
essence of the mediation posture), relational privileges do not allow
parties to unilaterally shield information from the trier of fact when
another party wishes to disclose it. Confidential communication
privileges that are aimed at enhancing relational interests do not
disclosure and provide a limited remedy for unauthorized disclosure. That
may "enhance" a relationship, but it cannot "protect" it in the sense of stopping
or preventing undesirable behavior. Evidentiary privileges cannot stop or
prevent erroneous or wrongful coercion of disclosure and cannot stop or
prevent parties from talking "out of school."
258. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1121 (Deering 2004) (stating that reports,
assessments, recommendations, and findings remain confidential "unless all
parties to the mediation expressly agree otherwise in writing or orally").
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Eisendrath v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 724 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (the waiver provisions of California Evidence Code section 912 only
apply to the privileges enumerated in that section; the mediation privilege of
section 1119 is not included in these privileges.).
262. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 962 (exception to attorney-client privilege
where joint clients have a dispute); id. § 984 (exception to marital confidential
communication privilege for proceedings between spouses); id. § 987
(exception to marital confidential communications privilege where one spouse
is a criminal defendant based on, among other things, conduct toward the other
spouse).
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apply in disputes between joint holders of the privilege. But a
mediation, under any definition, is an attempt to resolve a dispute
between joint holders of the mediation privilege.
Had the California legislature been able to see the difference
between protecting relational interests and protecting informational
interests, it might well have decided to make the mediation privilege
a qualified informational privilege, in which information made "for
the purpose of' mediation as well as information disclosed during
and "pursuant to" the mediation is presumptively protected, but can
be discovered and used as evidence on a proper showing of need.
Although there is certainly power in the relationship dynamics
of mediation (between the parties, their attorneys, and the mediator),
the real "value" or "currency" in mediation is the information that is
or is not disclosed-either to the mediator or to one party or the
other. Information-about the parties' needs, interests, damages,
inculpatory or exculpatory evidence, among other things-provides
the central movement toward (or away from) resolution.263 Thus, it
makes far more sense for the Legislature to treat the mediation
privilege as an informational privilege, as the California Court of
Appeal tried to do by analogizing to work product protection, which
is also most clearly thought of as a qualified informational
privilege. 264 The California mediation privilege simply does nothing
to enhance or promote relational interests. It can, however, be a very
useful means to limit the availability and use of valuable personal or
proprietary information in current or subsequent litigation. There has
been, however, no showing that it is necessary to create an
"absolute" privilege (more absolute than any other existing privilege)
in order for parties to engage in mediation.2 65  Thus, a qualified
263. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REv. 323, 393 (1994) (stating that "information is the
raw material of the mediator's craft"), quoted in Ellen E. Deason, Procedural
Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-Worldwide, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 563 (2005) ("In settlement mediation, exchange of
information is an important aspect of the process as parties work toward
reaching a consensual agreement.").
264. This argument appears in brief in Part II, Section I of this article, but
also is sufficiently significant to warrant its own article.
265. Consider this mediator's rather candid assessment:
Theory tells us that absolute confidentiality is necessary for candor,
so that the parties will talk about their weaknesses as well as their
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privilege would both protect the information and yet allow disclosure
where a sufficient factual showing of need exists.
As one looks toward prospective legislative action on the
California mediation privilege, there is also an enduring lesson for
the California courts. Some would argue that the California Supreme
Court appropriately declined to resolve the problem through
interpretation-that the legislature created the problem and the
legislature should solve it. This overlooks the judiciary's unique role
and responsibility when it comes to interpreting evidentiary rules,
however. Because of overwhelming political pressure or enthusiasm,
legislatures sometimes overreach. Statutory language is often
imperfect. Courts exist to bring that abstract language to life in
particular cases, and the consequences of some legislation may not
come to light until this happens. While it is certainly appropriate for
a court to refuse to decide a case by wholesale redrafting of a statute,
in most cases this approach is less satisfactory in the context of
evidence rules. Evidence rules, as well as other procedural
provisions, are central to the functioning of the judicial system; thus,
the judiciary has a special place in their interpretation.
When problems arise in a legislative scheme directed at
controlling the access of information in courts, courts should not feel
as constrained in interpreting these statutes as they might in areas
wholly unrelated to the functioning of the judicial system. Even
under the "power" theory of privilege, judges have legitimate power
to exercise through judicial interpretation. Judges must not allow
shrill threats directed at "judicial activism" to discourage them from
carrying out their interpretative responsibilities. In days when
legislative agendas are full and the desire to "fix" gaps in procedural
legislation fight inertia, courts arguably have even greater
responsibility to see if the issue can be resolved through their
expertise in interpreting abstract language in concrete cases.
strengths.
But, let's face it, the gaming of mediation has evolved far beyond
such naYvet& Nobody confesses their weaknesses in mediations.
Why should they? If the other side already knows, there's no reason
to confess anything. If the other side does not know, it would be
downright stupid. Why disclose, voluntarily, something that will
weaken your bargaining position?
Kichaven, supra note 231, at 130.
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In the case of California's mysterious mediation privilege, it
would be best if the California legislature could understand and
implement the distinction between relational and informational
privileges. For the reasons above, I suggest that the mediation
privilege be reassigned to Division 8 of the California Evidence
Code, dealing with privileges, and be redrafted as a qualified
informational privilege. That would mean that the legislature entrusts
the California courts with the ability to balance the interest in
protecting that information (here, the incentive to mediate in private
to reduce the burden on public courts) with other litigants' need for
the information. Understanding that the mediation privilege shields
informational interests rather than relational interests should make it
easier to return that power to the courts, which routinely make these
kinds of balancing decisions. Moreover, it would require the
legislature to explicitly state, as it does for other privileges, the
applicable exceptions, if any, and conditions of waiver. In short,
recognizing the mediation privilege as a qualified informational
privilege would require both the legislature and the courts to do their
respective jobs.
V. CONCLUSION
In these days when personal privacy is threatened, it is not
fashionable to argue for more thoughtful and limited approaches to
evidentiary privileges, especially in the popular context of alternative
dispute resolution. Nonetheless, a nuanced approach that analyzes
the rationales for privileges in light of the different relational and
informational interests they protect, rather than as a single unitary
concept, can help to balance both the desire to protect certain
information or to enhance particular relationships and the need for
credible, relevant evidence.
This approach to evidentiary privileges, however, can only
succeed if the government actors responsible for creating and
interpreting privileges work in tandem to identify the interests at
stake and apply their separate institutional strengths. Evidentiary
privileges in most jurisdictions are created by legislatures. This is
not surprising, given the conflicting social policies embodied by each
type of privilege. Legislatures provide an open forum for airing
these conflicts, for debating their relative merits, and for reaching
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political compromise and resolution. Yet when particular courts
confront privilege issues, they are faced with excluding evidence that
can be crucial to the fair resolution of disputes-both the immediate
dispute and long-range disputes. The increasingly secret world of
alternative dispute resolution magnifies this problem. The tension is
mounting and the pendulum that has swung wildly to the side of
privacy and efficiency is just beginning to swing back to openness
and the larger public interests protected by the public adversarial
process. The mysterious case of the mediation privilege
demonstrates that there is a middle ground if one is willing to accept
that the opposing positions each have limitations and that courts can
be trusted to mediate a fair resolution somewhere in between.
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